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Abstract 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM program in Transnational and European Commercial 
Law, Banking Law, Mediation and Arbitration at the International Hellenic University. 
 
This thesis investigates the “Societas Europaea”, a relatively new supranational corporate type, which 
aims at the reforming and coordination of businesses located in different Member States desiring to 
engage in others more easily. As a corporate type, SE provides for some advantages and 
disadvantages which an interesting party should take really into account when it examines the 
possibility to convert into a SE. This study will try to be used as a delimitation and a general guideline 
of these two categories by analyzing specifically the strengths and weaknesses of the Regulation. 
Finally, proposals shall be made aiming the melioration of the institution. 
 
At this point, an important statement must be made. This thesis will not emphasize to all 
characteristics of SEs, nor shall discuss Council Directive 2001/86/EC regarding employee’s 
participation. Bibliography on these matters is abundant. Certainty, there will be brief mentions, only 
if the analysis requires them. 
 
Finally, I will like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Prof. T. Papadopoulos for his advice and 
guidance throughout the whole process and to Dimitra Zioga, a true companion to every step I made. 
This study is dedicated to her and to my mother. 
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Preface 
 
The main goal of the dissertation was to examine the core and fundamental notions related to the 
European Companies, determine the reasons of the lack of publicity in EU and find solutions for the 
improvement of this corporate type. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis explores critically the application and consequences of the Council’s Regulation (EC) No. 
2157 of 8 October 2001(hereafter Regulation) which concerns the regulatory framework of the 
European Company. 
 
A Societas Europaea or European Company (hereinafter SE) is a relatively new supranational 
corporate type which doesn’t aim to substitute the domestic ones, but it does exist in parallel with 
them. Overall, SE is a public limited-liability company with legal personality1. According to J. 
Marychurch2, the origin of the Latin name is quite interesting. There is a high probability that the 
name itself refers to the days of a unified imperial Roman control and the word “societas” may be 
rendered as fellowship, partnership, association or alliance. The father of the SE considered being 
Pieter Sanders, who promoted in 1959 the idea of the SE3. 
 
The primary essential initiative4 was made during the 70s, but the lack of consensus due to the 
differences of opinion mainly about the mandatory participation of employees on the company’s 
board stops any initiatives5. After a perennial negotiating period of 30 years, the European Company 
Statute became directly applicable to the Member States (hereafter MS) allowing corporations to 
 
1J. Schmidt, 'The European Company (SE): Practical Failure or Model for Other Supranational Company Types?' (2010) 1 
Asian Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 1, Iss. 2, p.1, Dirk van Gerven and Paul Storm, The European Company 
(Cambridge University Press 2006), p. 28-29, 
2J.Marychurch, ‘Societas Europaea: Harmonization or Proliferation of corporations in the European Union?’(2002) 
Australian International Law Journal, p.1, note 3 
3 H. Fleischer, ‘Supranational Corporate Forms in the European Union: Prolegomena to a Theory on Supranational Forms 
of Association’ (2010), Corporate forms 1671 Common Market Law Review 47, p.1675 
4Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, ibid, p. 3-4, 26-27, N.Lenoir, ‘The Societas Europaea (SE) in Europe, A promising start and 
an option with good prospects’ (2008), Utrecht Law Review , Vol.4, p. 13, W.G. Ringe, ‘The European Company Statute in 
the Context of Freedom of Establishment’ (2007), Journal of Corporate Law Studies, p. 186, L.M Teodorescu, ‘Societas 
Europaea. Establishment and Constitutive Elements’ (2015), Conferinta Internationala de Drept, Studii Europene si Relatii 
Internationale, p. 699, N. Lenoir, ‘The SE or Societas Europaea – A European Citizenship for Corporations’ (2007), 
European Company Law, vol.4, iss. 3, p. 116, H. Fleischer, supra, p.1675, Jan Cremers, Michael Stollt and Sigurt Vitols, A 
Decade Of Experience With The European Company (ETUI 2013),p. 9-10, , B. Keller, 'The European Company Statute: 
Employee Involvement-And Beyond' (2002) 33 Industrial Relations Journal, iss.5, p. 425, 427, A. Schulz and K. Eicker, ‘The 
European Company Statute – the German View’ (2001), INTERTAX, Kluwer Law International, vol. 29, iss. 10, p. 332 
5Stefano Lombardo and Piero Pasotti, 'The 'Societas Europaea': A Network Economics Approach' [2004] SSRN Electronic 
Journal. vol. 1(2), p.170, E. Perakis, ‘Η Ελληνική «Ευρωπαϊκή» Εταιρία’ (2006), Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη, para 3, p. 2-4, P. Pellé, 
'Companies Crossing Borders Within Europe' (2008) 4 Utrecht Law Review, iss. 6, p. 285, E.R Roelofs, Erwin R. ‘Shelf SEs 
and Employee Participation’ (2010). European Company Law 7, iss. 3 , p. 120, Christoph Teichmann, 'The European 
Company – A Challenge To Academics, Legislatures And Practitioners' (2003) 4 German Law Journal <http://www. 
cambrigde.org>., iss. 04, p. 309-310, available at https://www.cambridge.org 
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choose the SE type6. Originally, the legal basis for the introduction of the SE is art. 308 TFEU allowing 
the European Parliament to enact provisions necessary for the realization of the internal market7.  
 
However, the Regulation needs amendments aiming the proper exercise of cross-border activities. 
As it is obvious, the interpretation and the application of the Regulation not only have benefits but 
obstacles hindering the institutions’ popularity and progress. Thus, the purpose of this study is to 
proceed in a critical analysis of the Regulation by describing its positive drivers and drawbacks and 
more importantly expressing ways for its improvement.8. 
 
Originally, the legal basis for the creation of SEs is art. 308 TFEU which allows the European 
Parliament to enact provisions necessary for the realization of the internal market9. However, as any 
legal instrument, the Regulation needs of an amendment to allow the proper exercise of cross-border 
activities. As it is obvious, the interpretation and the application of the Regulation not only have 
benefits but obstacles hindering the institutions’ popularity and progress. Thus, the purpose of this 
study is to proceed in a critical analysis of the Regulation by describing its positive drivers and 
drawbacks and finally ways for enhancement10. 
 
This study is based on the current state of European Law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6Jodie A. Kirshner, 'A Third Way: Regional Restructuring and The Societas Europaea' (2010) 7 European Company and 
Financial Law Review., iss. 3, p. 445, W. Ringe, supra, p. 186, A. A. Tzounh, ‘Η Ευρωπαϊκή Εταιρία’ (2012), Δελτίο 
Φορολογικής Νομοθεσίας, vol. 1483, p. 196, J. Kirshner, ‘An Ever Closer Union" in Corporate Identity?: A Transatlantic 
Perspective on Regional Dynamics and the Societas Europaea’ (2012) 84, St. John's Law Review, Iss. 4, Article 2, p. 1284-
1285, C. H. Dickens, ‘Establishment of the SE Company: An Overview over the Provisions Governing the Formation of the 
European Company’ (2007) 18, European Business Law Review, iss. 6, p. 1423 
7 E. Perakis, suprapara 1, p.1 
8 C. Malke, “Taxation of European Companies at the Time of Establishment and Restructuring”, Deutsche 
Nationalbibliothek, Universität Mannheim, 2009, p. 1 
9 E. Perakis, para 1, p.1 
10 C. Malke, supra p. 1 
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CHAPTER I. : ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF ADVANTAGES IN SE 
 
LEVEL 1.01 Advantages 
Presently, there are 3283 established SEs in EU11 a fact that illustrates in a clyster-clear manner the 
dynamics of the new corporate type based on the variety of perks that it has to offer. Generally, the 
SE offers plenty of advantages worthy of analysis. 
 
(a) European I.D and “transnationality”. - 
 
First and foremost, the main positive characteristic of this corporate type is the transmission of a 
European image affecting directly the prestige and status of the company because of its direct 
association with the EU12. 
 
Via this European image, a company is more likely to enter new national markets and to improve its 
brand’s position. According to the 2010 European Commission’s Report, this is a significant 
advantage “for companies in small countries, in Eastern European countries, in Belgium and in 
export-oriented countries (e.g. Germany)13”. Furthermore, the acquisition of a European identity was 
the primary motive for many companies such as SCOR Global Life SE, BASF SE and Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE, Bauholding Strabag SE and Equens SE and Catalis SE to convert to an SE which are 
 
11 'Ecdb.Worker-Participation.Eu' (Ecdb.worker-participation.eu, 2020) 
<http://ecdb.workerparticipation.eu/show_overview.php?letter=A&orderField=se.se_name&status_id=3&title=Establis
hed%20SEs> accessed 29 January 2020 
12Έκθεση της Επιτροπής προς τo Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο και το Συμβούλιο - Η εφαρμογή του Κανονισμού 2157/2001 
του Συμβουλίου, της 8ης Οκτωβρίου 2001, περί του καταστατικού τηςΕυρωπαϊκής Εταιρίας (SE) COM (2010) 676., p.3, 
J. Schmidt, supra, p. 15, O. Khomenko, ‘The European Company (Societas Europaea) and Its Application in the Insurance 
Industry (Text in English)’ (2017) 3, European Insurance Law Review, p. 20, Peter A. Le Piane, “Stateless Corporations: 
Challenges the Societas Europaea presents for Immigration Laws’ (2003) 311, St. John's J.L. Comm, p. 2, European 
Commission’s Report, “Company law: Commission presents Report on how the European Company Statute works for 
business”, Brussels, November 19, 2010, p. 1, The European character is considered a huge advantage in Belgium and 
Netherlands according to Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, “The European Company Volume I”, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 147,266, Dirk van Gerven and Paul Storm, The European Company (Cambridge 
University Press 2008), p. 8, 116, “Almost all companies that have formed an SE have made public announcements relating 
to their Europe-wide activities and the European nature of their business to explain their choice of the SE corporate form. 
For instance, when announcing its conversion into an SE, Porsche declared: “The SE is a modern and internationally 
oriented corporate form which, inter alia, enables the size of the Supervisory Board (twelve members), which has proved 
its worth in the past, to be maintained for the future”, Ernst & Young, “Study on the operation and the impacts of the 
Statute for a European Company (SE)- Final Report”,  9 December 2009 , chapter 3,  p. 210 
13Έκθεση της Επιτροπής, p.3, “Hannover Re in their press release stated that the choice of SE corporate form underscores 
the company's international business operations and serves as a visible external expression of [...] corporate self-image 
as a European group with worldwide activities”, O. Khomenko, p. 20, Ernst & Young, “Study on the operation and the 
impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE)- Final Report”,  9 December 2009 , chapter 3,  p. 211 
SPILIOTIS E. IOANNIS                                                                                                                                                                                                9 
 
enormous players in their relevant market industry14. Facts showed that the European character is 
considered a huge advantage in Belgium and Netherlands15, whereas the distinctive SE after the 
designation of a company is lucrative in marketing and advertisement16. However, the Commission’s 
report states that this advantage is not a universal one. On the contrary, it is said that in specific 
sectors, markets prefer national trademark17. A vivid example is the preferences of car’s brands. A 
British company, named “Regtransfers18”, analyzed data from 49 States (from EU and third countries) 
illustrating that being SE in the auto-industry cannot assist the company in escaping competition. 
Thus, Volkswagen is the dominant automaker in Germany, not Porsche Automobil Holding SE19.  
 
Moreover, when an entity acquires the legal status of a SE, obtains a transnational character as well20 
which means that entities can operate beyond national borders.21 More specific, the supra-national 
character of an SE is considered a crucial factor in “cross-border mergers or structural changes in a 
group” because it reduces the “the feeling of a national ‘defeat’ of the management and staff in the 
absorbed company or previous subsidiaries”22. 
 
Furthermore, the acquired “supra-nationality” and emission of “European image” allow an SE to 
penetrate new markets easier. SE companies using their corporate vehicle without the necessity of 
forming separate entities within each country23 are easier trusted by foreigner investors, customers 
or consumers due to their European image.  
 
 
14 V.Snijder. & A. Dorresteijn. ‘Oil Disaster Spills Over BP Europa SE’ (2011) 8, European Company Law, iss. 1, p. 24, 
15 Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, “The European Company Volume I”, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 147,266 
16O. Khomenko, supra, p. 20, A. Tzouni, supra p. 196, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra, vol I, p. 121, 148, Dirk V. Gerven 
& Paul Strom, supra, vol. II, p. 153 
17Ernst & Young, supra, p. 211 
18 'Data' (GoogleDocs, 2020) https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1v4iVkn8deMy7vOUXlnfMa-
qBVkm8ufiFS0Q0TcX2u2k/edit#gid=75092141, accessed 15 December 2019. 
19'Ποια Μάρκα Αυτοκινήτου Προτιμούν Οι Κάτοικοι Ανά Χώρα Του Κόσμου - Epitrohon' (Epitrohon, 2020) 
<https://epitrohon.gr/piamarka-aytokinhtoy-protimoyn-oi-katoikoi-ana-xwra/> accessed 15 December 2019 
20Έκθεση της Επιτροπής, supra, p.3, No named author, "The European Company is Born" (2004) 15, International Tax  
Review, iss. 10, p. 28, Peter A. Le Piane, supra, p. 11, Holger Fleischer, supra, p.1672, V.Snijder,.& A. Dorresteijn. supra, 
p.23, Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 211. The notion of transnationality is defined as an aggregation of norms that 
are neither international, neither domestic, but something in between. Α. Γραμματικάκη-Αλεξίου, ‘Κοινοτικό Δίκαιο & 
Εμπορικό Δίκαιο’ (2007), ΣΕΕ, p.33 
21E. Perakis, supra, para 2, p.1-2 
22Έκθεσητης Επιτροπής, supra, p.3-4, European Commission’s Report, supra, p. 1 
23P. Piane, suprap.2 
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Consequently, another vantage is the positive feedbacks from third parties that did not know the 
status of the company and they are willing to interact with it, because of its EU association. The 
reason for this extended public’s interaction with a company is the fact that it incorporates beyond 
national borders and is well known globally, more than national corporate types24. 
 
According to Prof. Anna Zarkada25, the corporation’s reputation affects the public attitude towards 
that corporate entity. The aftereffect of the European I.D is for the SE-stocks’ value to be increased 
through the years26. In other words, being a SE grows the reputational value of an enterprise, as the 
public opinion is more receptive with a company associated with the EU27. Thus, with the increasing 
of brand loyalty and brand recognition, the value of the intangible assets of an SE is increased as 
well28. 
 
As more descriptively stated by the world’s most famous investor, W. Buffet, high risk derives from 
ignorance29. This neat formulation determines most traders and investors who are trying to avoid 
risky situations by interacting with companies that they possess more information about. The EU Law 
provides a certain level of security making them more comfortable since they are more familiar with 
Community Law. Therefore, when one desires to value a business, it is always for the benefit of the 
corporation to be associated with the  EU rather than with a state with a fragile economy.  
 
Also, the acquisition of a European image operates as a “signal” for the employees, customers, 
business partners or third parties to gain acceptance of the project within the company increasing 
the popularity thereto30.  
Further, this external publicity and the acquisition of the European image results in higher chances 
of securing funding from third parties31. External funding is a factor crucial for the progress and 
 
24T. Papadopoulos, ‘Απολογισμός εφαρμογής Καν. 2157/2001’ (2017) 23, ΕπισκΕΔ, iss. Α, p. 22 
25OmadaAristeias, 'Η ΕΤΑΙΡΙΚΗ ΦΗΜΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΜΕΣΑ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΗΣ ΔΙΚΤΥΩΣΗΣ' (Excellence.minedu.gov.gr, 2020) 
<http://excellence.minedu.gov.gr/draseis/listing/867-social-marketing>accessed 17 November 2019. 
26T. Papadopoulos, supra, p. 59, Η. Eidenmueller, Α Engert and L. Hornuf, “The Societas Europaea: Good News for 
European Firms”, [2009] ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 127/2009, available at SRRN: <https:// ssrn.com/abstract= 
1409555>, 1, last entry at 22-1-2020. 
27Ernst & Young, supra, chapter 3, p. 212, 
28Brand loyalty is the ability to keep existing consumers, whereas brand recognition is the ability to find new ones.D. 
Frykman and J.Tolleryd, “Corporate Valuation, an easy guide to measuring value (2003)”, Prentice Hall, p.41 
29R.L.Bloch, ‘My Warren Buffet Bible 2016’, PIATKUS, London, p.5 
30Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 219 
31T. Papadopoulos, supra p.24, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol. I, p. 8 
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sustainability of a corporation, which occurs due to the “stronger position in negotiations with banks 
and in bids for EU financial support32”.Thus, in a capitalistic economic system, in which financial 
service providers, such as bank institutions, operating in its centre, the tendency to opt for financing 
SE organizations proves in a crystal-clear manner the common belief of the superiority of the 
European Companies than their national competitors.  
 
(b ) Corporate mobility.- 
 
As another advantage, associated with the above-stated permeation to new markets, is the key 
characteristic of the institution of a European Company33. 
 
The main feature of SE is the ability of corporate mobility in the EU level according to art. 8(1)34.  This 
mobility is referred to as “an essential driver and real comparative advantage of the SE compared to 
national companies35” and a “milestone towards the European Internal Market”36. The unequalled 
freedom of movement, something unprecedented until the adoption of this commercial type, gives 
the motive for companies to reform into SEs37. Previously, the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (hereafter Court) provided abundant case-law regarding that matter38.  
 
32Έκθεση της Επιτροπής, suprap.4 
33Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra, vol.I, p. 11, 27-28, 68-73, 240, W. G. Ringe, supra, p. 185, Oleksandr Khomenko, 
supra, p. 15-17, E. Perakis, supra, para 80, p. 47, A. Tzouni, supra, p. 200-201, J. Schhmidt, supra, p.5, J. Kirshner, supra, 
p. 447, A.W. Grumberg and C. Le Gall-Robinson, "Societas Europaea: Ombres et Lumieres Societas Europaea: Shadows 
and Lights ," (2005) 6, International Business Law Journal, p. 742,744, K. Woffenden, “Societas Europaea fails to excite’ 
(2005) 45, Euro. Law, iss. 10, p. 1, P. Pelle, supra, p. 284, M. Stollt and S. Vitols, “A decade of experience with the European 
Company” (2013), etui, Brussels, p. 11, 24, V. Snijder. & A. Dorresteijn, supra, p.24-25, C. Cathiard, “European Added 
Value Assessment on a Directive on the cross-border transfer of company seats (14th company law Directive)” (2012), 
European Union, p. 23-24, B. Ballester & M. del Monte, supra, p. 17, In Ernst and Young study, corporate mobility was 
the primary reason among the positive drivers for the popularity of the SE, Ernst & Young, supra, chapter 3,  p. 212, 
Έκθεση της Επιτροπής, supra, p. 4 
34W. Ringe, supra, p. 186-187, D. Dusan, ‘European Companies: Dead End or Boulevard to the Future: A Review of the 
Advantages and Problems with the Creation of European Companies’ (2008) 9, Common Law Review, iss. 1, p. 32, J. 
Marychurch, supra p. 99-100, European Commission’s Report, supra, p. 1 
35Έκθεση της Επιτροπής, supra p.4 
36 W. G. Ringe, supra p. 185. 
37Before the adoption of the Regulation, the Court held that “that the right of freedom of establishment, granted by the 
Articles 43 and 48 EC Treaty, did not extend to a corporation’s ability to transfer its place of incorporation” W. Ringe, 
supra p. 187 
38Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.I, p. 5-6, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol. II p. 6-7, 153, L. Sasso, ‘Societas 
Europaea : Between Harmonization and Regulatry Competition’ (2007) 4, European Company Law , issue 4, p. 159-160, 
J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1286-1287, P. Pelle, supra, p. 286-287, F. Drinhausen and N. Nohlen, “The Limited Freedom 
of Establishment of an SE’ (2009) 6, European Company Law, iss. 1, p. 14, G. Van Eck and E. R. Roelofs, “SE Mobility: 
Taking a Short Cut? A Recommendation for Amendment of the SE Regulation” (2009) 6, European Company Law, iss. 3, 
p. 105, R. Drury, “The European Private Company” (2009) 6, European Business Organization Law Review, p. 128-130, 
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Specifically, the Court declared in Centros Case39 that “it is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty 
for a Member State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the law 
of another Member State in which it has its registered office but in which it conducts no business” 
allowing to carry out activities through a subsidiary based in another state40. Also, in Uberseering41 
the Court recognized the legal capacity for an entity to defend its rights in a legal dispute in a foreign 
state, and in Inspire Art.42stressed the inability for an MS to impose specific obligations to a foreign 
institution, even as “a matter of form”43, with some exceptions. Finally, in Sevic44, the Court ruled 
that refusion to register foreign company resulting from a cross-border merger was against EU Law. 
 
The above-mentioned cases were, of course, tangible progress meliorating the legal conditions for 
corporations in EU, but with the constitution of SEs, the legal regime went a step further. SE can 
amongst other things transfer its place of incorporation45 from one state to another with no 
consequences in its substance46 reflecting this transition in caselaw. Also, according to the art.8 of 
the Regulation, “a transfer shall not result in the winding up of the SE or the creation of a new legal 
person”. So, as a benefit, the seat transfer is progressed with no liquidation of the company and more 
importantlyis resulting in the continuity of the legal personality of the SE throughout the whole 
process47. This has a powerful impact on the avoidance of normal company law reverberations, like 
 
E.R. Roelofs, ‘Cross-Border Division of SEs’ (2010) 7, European Company Law, iss. 4, p. 142, C. Cathiard, supra, p. 21-22, 
B. Ballester & M. del Monte, supra p. 18-19, 28, S.Deakin, “Is regulatory competition the future for European integration?” 
(2006) 13, Swedish Economic Policy Review, p. 80-84, Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 260-262 
39'EUR-Lex - 61997CJ0212 - EN - EUR-Lex' (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2020)  
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61997CJ0212#SM> accessed 17 November 2019. 
40N.Lenoir, supra p.16 
41(2020) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62000CJ0208,> accessed 17 November 2019. 
42'EUR-Lex - 62001CJ0167 - EN - EUR-Lex' (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2020) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62001CJ0167>accessed 17 November 2019, C. Kersting and C.P Schindler, “The ECJ’s 
Inspire Art Decision of September 2003 and its Effects on Practice” (2003) 1277, German Law Journal, p. 1-4 
43N.Lenoir, supra p. 16, A. A. Tzouni, supra p. 196 
44'EUR-Lex - 62003CJ0411 - EN - EUR-Lex' (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2020) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62003CJ0411> accessed 17 November 2019. 
45Or registered office as it called. 
46From Dutch perspective, the corporate mobility in conjunction without the requirement to first dissolve and 
reincorporate and its ability to participate in cross-border mergers is an enormous advantage. Dirk van Gerven and Paul 
Storm, supra vol.I, p. 298, W. Ringe, supra p. 186, E. Perakis, supra para 164, p.99, L. Sasso, supra p. 161, Christine H. 
Dickens, supra, p. 1461, G. Van Eck and E. R. Roelofs, supra, p. 106, A. Schulz and K. Eicker, “ The European Company 
Statute – the German View” (2001) 29, INTERTAX, Kluwer Law International, iss. 10, p. 332, C. Teichmann, supra, p. 313 
47The significance is illustrated clearly in states that “do not allow companies to transfer their registered office outside 
their jurisdiction or in which such a transfer would result in the winding-up of the company in the departure Member 
State”. These states are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia.  Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3 p. 212, footnote 151, B. Dzida, “Stillborn or still to bloom?” (2008) 78, European 
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extended cost as a result of winding-up and reforming or more importantly jeopardy of previously 
acquired licenses48. Moreover, these implications affect the timeline of completion of the procedure 
since it takes significantly less time for seat transfers. 
 
Essentially, these above factors illustrate directly the following: The Regulation does aim “to cut 
companies' administrative costs, provides them with a legal structure suitable for their cross-border 
activities within the EU49”. 
 
According to N.Lenoir50, SEs can combine all techniques of corporate mobility meaning “the cross-
border mergers, transfer of registered office and fiscal neutrality for cross-border transactions”.This 
simple relocation of the organization’s headquarters without affecting its legal personality51, gives 
an unprecedented appliance to the freedom of establishment52 that companies desire to use53.  
Therefore, companies transfer to other MS to can benefit from more flexible regimes54. For instance, 
Elcoteq SE has converted into an SE and then transferred its registered office from Finland to 
Luxembourg to be applicable in a more flexible domestic legislation55.  
 
Despite the above, data show that as the characteristic of corporate mobility is considered a merit 
only on paper. In the Commission’s Report56 is stated that as of June 2010 only 49 SEs transferred 
 
Lawyer, p. 32, E. Perakis, supra para 81, p.47, F. Ichay and M Schocher, “The French SE: An Attractive Tool to Facilitate an 
International Merger?” (2006) 3, European Company Law, iss. 4, p. 167, F. Drinhausen and N. Nohlen, supra p. 15 
48Notable example is Swiss Re, for more SEEJ. Kirshner, "An Ever Closer Union" in Corporate Identity?: A Transatlantic 
Perspective on Regional Dynamics and the Societas Europaea(2012) 84", St. John's Law Review,Iss. 4, Article 2, p. 1302-
1303 
49'Glossary Of Summaries - EUR-Lex' (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2020) <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/eu_company.html>, “Companies have converted to the SE in order to gain ownership 
of their subsidiaries using mergers rather than takeovers, at lower cost and risk”. Also, Swiss Re used the conversion into 
SE to avoid losing acquired licenses. J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p.1296-1297, 1302-1303 
50L.Nenoir, suprap.17 
51E. Perakis, supra p.47 
52The freedom of establishment is one of the ‘four freedoms’ of the internal market, which has the purpose to surge the 
competitiveness and prosperity of all MSs in the EU by obliterating walls between them. C. Cathiard, supra, p. 20-21, Horst 
Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert and Lars Hornuf, 'How Does the Market React to The Societas Europaea?' (2010) 11 
European Business Organization Law Review, p.36, For A. Schulz and K. Eicker, the introduction of the SE corporate type 
was a major progress for the freedom of Establishment. A. Schul and K. Eicker, supra p. 336 
53Narada convert to SE to transfer its seat from Norway to the UK 19. J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1315-1316 
54Luxembourg is considered by many the most flexible and attractive legal jurisdiction. Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 
214, 227 
55J. Kirshner, p.1302-1303 
56ΈκθεσητηςΕπιτροπής, suprap.4 
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their registered office, while up until February 2017 only 10057. Companies hesitate to transfer their 
seat due to the subsequent change of national law58. Nevertheless, no one can deny the significance 
of the acquirement of primary and secondary freedom of establishment, which is expressed in the 
wording of the Regulation59.  
 
( c) Proper Governance. - 
 
Another extremely significant outcome deriving from the Regulation is related to the governance of 
the company. The notion of tailor-made corporate governance related to the corporate’s 
productivity illustrates the importance of apposite management60.  
 
For a global organization, such as Airbus SE61, the concept of good governance is of utmost 
importance. Primarily, the Regulation sets this absolute goal in preamble 14 stating that “an SE must 
be efficiently managed and properly supervised”. Those are not empty words or a wish list. On the 
contrary, the Regulation explains how this is possible in article 38 section b’, according to which the 
management shall be made “either by a supervisory organ and a management organ (two-tier 
system) or an administrative organ (one-tier) depending on the form adopted in the statutes”. Thus, 
the Regulation provides for the possibility of choice between two different structure systems 
something unprecedented in many jurisdictions62. 
 
 
57T.Papadopoulos, suprap. 46 
58J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1314, T. Papadopoulos, ibid 
59Έκθεση της Επιτροπής, suprap.4 
60Spiliou Ant.Mouzoula, ‘Εταιρική Διακυβέρνηση (Corporate Governance)’ (2003), Sakoulas, para 1, p.21-22, Dirk V. 
Gerven & Paul Strom, “The European Company Volume I”, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 8 
61Airbus SE is serving worldwide with total assets of 115.19 billion and with 133,671 as of the year 2018, ,'Financial Results 
& Annual Reports' (Airbus, 2020) <https://www.airbus.com/investors/financial-results-and-annual-reports.html> 
accessed 29 January 2020 
62J. Schmidt, supra p. 5-6, 15, C. Rose, “The New Corporate Vehicle Societas Europaea (SE): consequences for European 
corporate governance” (2007) 15, Corporate Governance, iss. 2, p. 112, 114, 2. Dirk van Gerven and Paul Storm, supra 
vol.I, p. 15, 59,62-68, 240,  A. Tzouni, supra p. 201, S. Lombardo & P. Pasotti, supra p. 175, 179-180, D. Hrabanek, 
"European Companies: Dead End or Boulevard to the Future: A Review of the Advantages and Problems with the Creation 
of European Companies (2008 9" Common Law Review, no. 1, J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1328, F. Ichay and M 
Schocher, supra p. 167, Ernst & Young, Study on the operation and the impacts of the Statute for a European Company 
(SE), December 2009, p. 77, 340, 515, 712, M. Stollt and S. Vitols, supra p. 11, 24, V.Snijder. & A. Dorresteijn, supra p.25, 
B. Keller, supra p. 424, European Commission’s Report, supra, p. 1, Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3,  p. 224, C. Teichmann, 
supra, p. 312-313 
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Notably, Art. 39-42 describe the two-tier system according to which an SE has a management body 
and a separate supervisory body, a system more appropriate for large enterprises since the two 
boards have more comprehensive tasks in specific contexts. The members of the first are appointed 
and recalled by the latter body, whereas the supervisory body is scrutinized by the General Meeting. 
The management is obliged to inform per semester the supervisors, and indubitably there is no 
possibility of to be a member in both bodies63. On the other hand, art. 43-45 describe the one-tier 
system. In this system, there is only one administrative body appointed by the General Meeting, a 
scheme more suitable for smaller corporations that desire better information flow and easier shaping 
of long-term strategy64. Thus, the differences are colossal making the choice of utmost importance. 
The significance of the option is illustrated in the example of Plansee SE, an Austrian metalworks 
enterprise, that became an SE to replace its two-tier board with a one-tier, despite the upsurge of 
the number of external directors65. 
 
Surely, this choice has a political complexion, since the SE itself will have to evaluate its bodies who 
are to participate in governance and supervision66. Therefore, the choice itself contains the 
initiatives, the prohibitions and overall the context within the company shall act67 and reflects the 
level of the desired coordination between management and supervision68. Besides, the level of the 
arranging is correlated with the sustainability and the life span of the corporation illustrating the 
significance of the choice per se. 
 
 
63C, Wilk, ‘U.S Corporation going European? The one-tier Societas Europaea (SE) in Germany; (2012) 31,  Suffolk Transnat'l 
L. Rev, p. 7,9, Caspar Rose, supra p.114-115, Boris Dzida, supra p. 33, J. Kirshner supra, Article 2, p. 1329, In Ernst and 
Young study is stated that in Czech Republic “the possibility of having a board of directors and a supervisory board each 
with only one member is perceived as the main driver for having an SE instead of a national public limited liability 
company, which must have at least three members on its board of directors”, Ernst & Young, supra p. 169 
64C. Wilk, ibid 
65J. Schmidt, supra p. 5, Another example is PCC, an energy company used the Regulation to increase the authority of the 
owner. J. Kirshner, supra p. 471-472, A conducted survey by Horst Eidenmiiller, Andreas Engert and Lars Hornuf indicates 
that according to responses for 30 German SEs, the desire to choose between the one-tier and the two-tier board structure. 
Horst Eidenmiiller, Andreas Engert, Lars Hornuf, supra p. 22, “For mid-sized companies in Germany, the SE is becoming 
an increasingly popular way to “freeze’ employees’ representation in the supervisory board: while a (public) limited 
liability company”, D. Dzida, supra p. 2, J.Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1329-1330, “the introduction of a one-tier 
management system could also help to promote the establishment of new corporate organizational schemes in Austria”, 
Dirk van Gerven and Paul Storm, supra vol.I p. 121 
66For instance, a two-tier board system encompasses an inferior risk that the CEO or others are to harass board’s 
activities, since the members of the supervisory board ceteris paribus are more autonomous. C. Rose, supra p. 116 
67 Spiliou Ant. Mouzoula, supra para 3, p.23.  
68Jodie A. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1334 
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Thereupon, the European legislator realizes that to attract companies to adopt the Regulation, an 
entirely new legal concept, the benefits must be obvious and tangible. Owners of a business may 
seem reluctant to switch to a management system that is not applicable in their country of origin, 
and therefore unknown and different69. For instance, in Belgium law, only the one-tier system exists, 
whereas in Cyprus only the two-tier70. The EU lawmaker avoided this major issue realizing that in 
Europe there are mainly two systems of corporate governance71. For this reason, art. 39-51 provide 
for the opportunity to SEs to opt for between the two-tier and one-tier system72. 
 
The above political manoeuvre and compromise has a variety of further advantages for the 
promotion of the SE institution itself and businesses contemplating of becoming ones. As for the 
promotion, the optionality system works as an “advertisement” of the concept, since the SE is 
promoted as a more flexible from domestic corporate types that provide for only one system73. The 
freedom of choice makes the interest parties examine the potential benefits to gain. For instance, if 
one desires to have a more flexible, prompt organization, normal flow of information and vicinity of 
supervisory members to the final decisions, he/she could opt for the one-tier system, while, in the 
case that prefers the clear distinction of management and supervision, the other regime is to be the 
preferred one74. So curiosity is triggered regarding further potential perks of the institution. 
Another key aspect that establishes better and preferable conditions for the company is the fact the 
Regulation reduces the number of the supervisory board than the number required by the national 
 
69E. Perakis, supra para 91, p.54-55 
70 Ernst & Young, Study on the operation and the impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE), December 2009, 
p. 76, 134 
71In Greece or England, there is the one-tier system, whereas in Germany, a country with several SE companies, the two-
tier system. According to C. Malke, the main reason for lots of SEs in Germany is the flexibility that is provided by the 
Regulation to the management with the one-tier system. Other reasons are the further flexibility “regarding employee 
involvement in big companies and may even avoid or freeze employee involvement in medium-sized enterprises compared 
to national companies” and the omission of a EU I.D. C. Malke, supra p. 14, E. Perakis,supra  para 91 p. 54, A. Tzouni, 
supra p. 201 
72The actual trend is companies to opt for MSs that have the two-tier system than those with the one-tier system.A. Tzouni, 
supra p. 206,  
73J. Schmidt, supra p. 6-7 
74Perakis, supra para 91 p.54 
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legal regimes75. According to J.Reichert and others76, the primary reason for entities such as Allianz77, 
Fresenius, BP Europa and BASF to convert into an SE was the reduction of the number of members 
of the supervisory board. Large corporations are in a constant search for the most convenient 
corporate type more suitable to their own needs. This is a clear example of how the Regulation 
provides for that very end.  
The above-mentioned declaration can be interpreted in another way. A large institution that 
possesses the means and legal personnel, will simply try to find the proper formula to do business 
with the lesser number possible of legal requirements. In any given case, the fewer restrictions a 
regulation or a directive have the better for its a posteriori compliance. Less number of obligations, 
the better the chances of conformity. Therefore, the Regulation creates an entity and a system that 
contributes teleologically with higher changes of consolidation. 
Correspondingly, the Regulation provides for discretion to the SE to improve itself by taking various 
resolutions about its governance. Descriptive examples are the decision that can be made regarding 
the number of the bodies’ members, the duration of their service78. No one can argue that flexibility 
is absent in SEs. 
Also, with the ability to replace subsidiaries with branches, centralized regulation is achievable79 as 
well as the reduction of costs. The outcome is that the Regulation allows the creation and 
development of true corporate groups within the territory of the EU with sophisticated control, as it 
will be examined further80.  
 
75Horst Eidenmiiller, Andreas Engert, Lars Hornuf, supra p. 22 
76J. Reichert, 'Experience With The SE In Germany (2008) 4’ Utrecht Law Review, IGITUR, p. 26-27, Boris Dzida, supra p. 
33, J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1303-1334-1335, V. Snijder& A. Dorresteijn, supra p. 25.  The process is supervised by 
only one competent authority, not as many as the states concerned. The use of the Regulation to form an SE by Sampo 
Life was made to absorb its subsidiaries moderating the scrutiny by national supervisors at the same time. J. Kirshner, p. 
457 
77Apart from that, Allianz had a variety of reasons to convert to an SE, notably adapting the group's structure to match 
its economic activities in 29 MSs, simplifying and reorganizing the group's structure, reducing costs and reducing the 
number of minority shareholders. Armand W. Grumberg and C. Le Gall-Robinson, supra p. 759, N. Lenoir, “The SE or 
Societas Europaea – A European Citizenship for Corporations (2007) 4”, European Company Law, iss. 3, article 2, p. 116 
78A. Tzouni, supra p. 202 
79J.Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1300, V.Snijder & A. Dorresteijn, suprap. 26 
80The outcomes of converting a subsidiary to a branch are, first and foremost, the applicable law to be the same with the 
parent company, (whereas a subsidiary has the one of its seat), reduction of costs related to running a subsidiary in 
multiple MSs, no separate board, or auditors, no need for legal personnel in each State, etc. Ernst & Young, supra chapter 
3,  p. 225 
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(d) Corporate Control. - 
Further, another vantage related to governance is control. A SE is accompanied by a high level of 
control due to the coordination for the various companies involved in it.  
The priority of the management of a corporate group, or a thumping entity, is to have the overall 
control of its activities. To this end, the Regulation offers for the restructuring of a group, and a more 
simplified structure81.  
The regulation provides for better circumstances to exercise control to an enormous entity because 
it simplifies the corporate structure by operating with only one management exercising control and 
facilitates the highest level of coordination for the various companies involved in the SE. The 
homogeneity is achievable due to the absence of different management groups operating in different 
states. As Perakis82 stated, the presence of single management in a European Level is something quite 
significant. This is an extra positive characteristic because it reduces the additional corporation costs 
ofdecision making by various boards established in various countries83. 
So, an SE provides for a faster, more homogeneous decision-making and with less administrative 
costs procedure contributing to a more sophisticated management’s operation and to a better-
quality control84. And as mentioned before, the process is supervised by only one competent 
authority, not as many as the states concerned85. Furthermore, the fact that the operational 
management is one leads to more unified structures and reduces the tensions based on the different 
cultures occurred in an international company, a key aspect for an entity as Airbus, or EADS, where 
differences between domestic cultures area significant cause of tension86.  
 
Overall, the Regulation creates the perfect conditions for the “reorganization and simplification of 
the structure of the group”. Therefore, daily activities are exercised in a more refined way in an SE.  
 
 
81Έκθεση της Επιτροπής, suprap. 4 
82Perakis, supra para 164 p. 100 
83T.Papadopoulos, supra p.24, footnote 25 
84Swiss RE converted to an SE to “gain access to EU legislation more cheaply” by relocating to Luxemburg. J.Kirshner, 
supra p. 458 
85The use of the Regulation to form an SE by Sampo Life was made to absorb its subsidiaries moderating the scrutiny by 
national supervisors at the same time. J. Kirshner, supra p. 457 
86N. Lenoir, supra p.15 
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(e ) Existence of SEs holding companies. - 
Over the above, a SE can operate transnationally with other companies in a holding company87to 
establish international status’ groups of undertakings according to art. 2(2) and 32 of the 
Regulation88. This is noteworthy because it allows conglomerates, consisting of different entities, to 
operate under one management89. 
 
In an SE the situation is simplified further because profits generated in different states can be used 
within the SE without distribution90. It is up to the organization to opt for the best practice according 
to its own needs. Control and governance are easier91. Certainly, the Regulation enables enterprise 
groups to “reorganize their European group-structure and to operate with a single company instead 
of a web of subsidiary companies92”. 
 
(f ) Renewal of Corporate Law/Domestic law dependence 
 
Last, but not least, there is another key feature to take into consideration. Lastly, art. 9 sets the 
standard that any gaps in Regulation are to be fulfilled by the national law of the seat. Thus, because 
of the existing differences enabled in an SE, there is an ongoing regulatory competition93 between 
MSs trying to take advantage of their differentials to increase the number of corporations established 
in their territory. 
 
More specifically, due to the dependence on national law MSs are developing the motive to create 
the most legally preferred regime to obtain the positive outcome of having a SE organization 
established in their jurisdiction. So, MSs will, for instance, provide for tax reductions as a motivation 
 
87Is an undertaking that holds shares of other companies and therefore it controls them.  L. Teodorescu, supra p. 702 
88K. Oplustil, "Selected Problems concerning Formation of a Holding SE (Societas Europaea) (2003) 4" German Law 
Journal, iss. 2, p. 108, E. Perakis, supra para133, p. 77, A. Tzouni, supra p. 197, D. Hrabanek, supra p. 33, J. Marychurch, 
supranp. 95, L. Teodorescu, supra p. 701-702 
89the applicable law regarding the business groups again national law provides for the answer. This is illustrated by art. 
10 of the Regulation and preamble 15. E. Perakis, supra para 133, p. 77 
90C. Wilk, supra p. 11 
91E. Perakis, supra para 164, p. 100 
92Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3 p. 218 
93 For the Definition of the Regulatory competition See Hanne S. Birkmose, “Regulatory Competition and the European 
Harmonisation Process” (2006) 17, European Business Law Review, issue 4, p. 1076-1077, S. Deakin, “Is regulatory 
competition the future for European integration?”(2006) 13, Swedish Economic Policy Review, p. 74 
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for companies’ establishment94. To examine this assumption, there is the precedent of the USA 
jurisdictions, where different corporate company laws are driven by the individual state’s efforts to 
compete. The outcome is that the Delaware corporate legal system to be considered as the most 
preferable regime for corporations. This continuous competition between states widely known as 
the “Delaware Effect95” means that in free-market competition, like the one existing in the USA, 
states compete for each other attracting incorporations96. In other words, there is a regulatory 
rivalry, a race to the top which describes a process whereby legislators deliberately are enacting the 
most suitable and attractive legal regime to lure the largest amount of businesses due to the 
subsequent economic benefits97. 
 
This phenomenon of states’ opposition results in “country shopping98” and could work for the benefit 
of the institution of SE commercial type99. Explanatorily, the notion of forum shopping or legal 
arbitrage is defined as the situation in which companies are opting as a seat of administration the 
one with the most preferable conditions. A clear example is the escape of companies from major tax 
burden to states with less taxation aiming to profits100. 
 
 
94S. Kadi, "Tax Issues and Tax Treatment of the Societas Europaen (2013) 2", Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 2013, iss. 
2, p.3, Horst Eidenmiiller, Andreas Engert and Lars Hornuf, “Incorporating under European Law: The Societas Europaea 
as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage (2009) 10”, European Business Organization Law Review, p. 2-3, F. Ichay and M. Schocher, 
supra, p. 168-169 
95L. Enriques, "Silence Is Golden: The European Company as a Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage (2004) 4" Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies, iss. 1, p. 80, D. Siclari, “A renewed Delaware Effect for Company Regulation in EU? The case of 
European Company (SE)”, The Columbia Journal of European Law Online, p. 2, E. Perakis, supra para 160, p.96-97, Hanne 
S. Birkmose, supra, p. 1081, H. Birkmose, “The Fear of the Delaware-effect – the American Demon (2001)”, in Neville & 
Engsig Sørensen (eds), The Internationalisation Of Companies And Company Law, p 243, K.Sorensen & M. Neville, 
“Corporate Migration in the European Union (2000) 6”, Columbia Journal of European Law, p. 181-183, S. Deakin, supra 
p. 76-80, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 53-54 
96P.S.Ryan, “Will there ever be a Delaware of Europe?”, Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol 11:2 Colorado, 2004, p. 
199-200, Kirshner, Jodie A. (2012) ""An Ever Closer Union" in Corporate Identity?: A Transatlantic Perspective on Regional 
Dynamics and the Societas Europaea,"St. John's Law Review: Vol. 84: Iss. 4, Article 2, p. 1325 
97E. Perakis, supra para 160, p.97, L. Sasso, supra p. 163, S. Mock, ‘Harmonization, Regulation and Legislative Competition 
in European Corporate Law (2003) 3’, German Law Journal, para 12, p. 3-4, available at 
<http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=216> accessed in 14-01-2020, For the Definition of 
the Regulatory competition See Hanne S. Birkmose, supra article 1, p. 1076-1077, S Deakin, supra, p. 74 
98Other synonyms of the notion are company law arbitrage, law shopping, venue shopping etc. 
99For J. Kirshner, the transition from complete harmonization policies to a more open-limited completion of MSs, the SE 
evolved accordingly. J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1289, E. Perakis, supra para 138, p. 80-81, L. Sasso, supra p. 162-163 
100W. Ringe, supra p. 211, Horst Eidenmiiller, Andreas Engert, Lars Hornuf, supra article 2, p. 2-3, C. Cathiard, supra p. 58, 
S. Deakin, supra p. 73-74 
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Thus, with the constant changes and reforms of corporate law and due to the dependence of the SEs 
on domestic law in art. 9, each state will eventually have to follow the trend101. This happens due to 
the fear of “vote with the feet” principle which states that each state will eventually adopt the same 
favourable provisions, otherwise the relentless developments will lend to the MS’s marginalization 
since corporate mobility permits SEs to leave an MS that does not fulfil its appetite102. 
 
In other words, should a state desire to remain dominant and financially relevant, decisions and 
orders of National Administrations will be adopted to meet that end. So, it is obvious that corporate 
mobility affects the context of national law103. Another factor to examine is that corporations opting 
to remain in a less favourable state will cease to exist since the European competitors will operate in 
better environmental circumstances, have more chances for growth and fewer barriers to overcome. 
As for a deduction, since SE is characterized by corporate mobility, many companies will opt to 
transfer their seat to a preferable environment, as country shopping become the natural solution104. 
 
Therefore, via the European “Delaware effect” there is a renewal of Company Law, a quite significant 
outcome for the improvement of the Law itself, an aftereffect of limited competition among legal 
orders105. 
 
Lastly, the dependence on domestic law creates a level of certainty, since nationals are more aware 
of their legal system than the European one106. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101C. Rose, supra p.116-117, J. Kirshner, supra, Article 2, p. 1303-1304, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 60 
102 For more See Charles M. Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure (1956) 64” Journal of Political Economy , p.416–
424. L. Sasso, supra p. 162 
103L. Sasso,supra p. 162 
104E. Perakis, supra para 160, p.96-97 
105W. Rigne, supra p. 205, E. Perakis, ibid, L. Sasso, supra p. 162, Horst Eidenmiiller, Andreas Engert, Lars Hornuf, supra p. 
2-4 
106T. Papadoulos, supra p. 27 
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CHAPTER II.  ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DISADVANTAGES IN SE 
LEVEL 2.01 DISADVANTAGES 
Apart from advantages, the Regulation has several defects, one of which is related to an advantage 
already mentioned. 
(a) Domestic Dependence 
Firstly, examining the Regulation, one might say that, even though is deriving from an adopted 
regulation, it acts as a directive107exposing its substantial inadequateness108. Illustratively, a 
regulation enables an EU institution to impinge on the domestic legal systems with the ulterior goal 
of unification of law. On the other hand, directives, another legal instrument of secondary law, aim 
to reconcile the dual differences and objectives of national legal orders via harmonisation, not 
unification, two concepts different109. 
Unprecedentedly, the Regulation operates leaving gaps, whereas a normal “regulation is to ensure 
uniform application of the European Law in all MS” and every party shall “comply entirely with it”. 
On the contrary, it functions as if it is a directive in which “the choice of type and means are 
nevertheless left to the discretion of the national authorities”110. 
So, the SE Regulation, as stated above, leaves gaps creating confusion and enormous difficulties. 
Unfortunately, these gaps are covered with national law’s provisions governing other types of 
domestic corporations resulting in reducing the community character of SEs111. Thus, despite the 
direct applicability of the Regulation, the existence of the Renvoi Technique creates further 
contradiction and complexity. This technique, deriving from article 9112 of the Regulation, causally 
 
107Perakis, supra para 4, p.4 
108Perakis, suprapara 156, p.95 
109 Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, ‘The ABC of EU Law (2016) ‘ , 2nd edition p. 100-102 
110'Πηγές Και Πεδίο Εφαρμογής Του Δικαίου Της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | Θεματολογικά Δελτία Για Την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση 
| Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο' (Europarl.europa.eu, 2020) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/el/sheet/6/πηγες-
και-πεδιο-εφαρμογης-του-δικαιου-της-ευρωπαικης-ενωσης>accessed 1 December 2019. 
111Ken Woffenden, supra p. 1,  Perakis, supra para 154, p. 93-94, S. Lombardo & P. Pasotti, supra p. 176-180, F. Drinhausen 
and N. Nohlen, supra p. 15, European Commission’s Report, supra p. 1, Dirk van Gerven and Paul Storm, supra vol.I p. 14, 
Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3,  p. 242, C. Teichmann, supra, p. 315-317, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 26-27 
112Article 9 states that: “1. An SE shall be governed:(a)by this Regulation,(b)where expressly authorised by this Regulation, 
by the provisions of its statutesOr(c)in the case of matters not regulated by this Regulation or, where matters are partly 
regulated by it, of those aspects not covered by it, by:(i)the provisions of laws adopted by Member States in 
implementation of Community measures relating specifically to SEs;(ii)the provisions of Member States' laws which 
would apply to a public limited-liability company formed in accordance with the law of the Member State in which the 
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leads to monumental obstacles. Ordinarily, in a conflict of laws situation, the renvoi doctrine 
operates as a medicine to overcome difficulties deriving from the different legal orders. For an 
ordinance like SEs, the renvoi technique leads to a total absence of uniformity regarding crucial rules 
governing issues such as financing, or shares113. The outcome is, according to the Private 
International Law perspective, an SE to be considered a domestic company in most cases114, while a 
merger of separate SEs to constitute a cross-border merger115. So, the desired transnational element 
is absent. 
So, the main issue remains. Did the European Legislator manage to create a legal corporate entity 
which would operate as a supranational type, or the initiative did not provide fruitful results?  Further 
analysis needed. 
According to provision 9 of the Regulation, there is a regulatory system of two dimensions, inside of 
which the applicable law is not mainly the European, but the domestic as well116. The transition 
between the European and domestic legal orders “is direct, namely the minute a gap is 
ascertained117”. The Regulation operates within the dogma that due to the interconnectedness of 
different national markets in EU domestic peculiarities shall remain118. Those markets are the ones 
that at the end define the framework within which an SE proceeds to its activities and not the EU. 
The outcome is, as stated clearly in the Commission Report119, that there are “27 different SE types”, 
and not a single pan-European one. This dependence on national laws is to increase the legal 
uncertainty about the legal effects of the Regulation and more importantly the incertitude of 
interface with the domestic legal order120. This is crucial since it affects the decision making of the 
SE’s management when a board of directors unable to deep into the differences between the 
 
SE has its registered office;(iii)the provisions of its statutes, in the same way as for a public limited-liability company 
formed in accordance with the law of the Member State in which the SE has its registered office. 
2.The provisions of laws adopted by Member States specifically for the SE must be in accordance with Directives 
applicable to public limited-liability companies referred to in Annex I. 
3.If the nature of the business carried out by an SE is regulated by specific provisions of national laws, those laws shall 
apply in full to the SE”. 
113For more See L. Enriques, supra p.87-95 
114Regarding the state that has its seat 
115E. Perakis, supra para 157, p.95, 
116T. Papadopoulos, supra. 27, S. Lombardo & P. Pasotti, supra p. 178 
117E. Perakis, supra para 9, p.7 
118Spiliou. Ant. Mouzoula, supra para 18, p.43 
119Έκθεσητης Επιτροπής, supra p.11, M. Stollt and S. Vitols supra p. 13 
120Έκθεσητης Επιτροπής, ibid, W. Ringe, supra p. 187, B. Keller, supra p. 434 
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national laws’ progress in further costs for legal counsel121. Also, the dependence on domestic law 
affects the status of SEs as a European, or transnational entity. It is supported that an SE is a hybrid 
of domestic and European Law, or just a new national corporate type122. 
More specifically, the importance for the coherence and continuity of the SEs, as a commercial type, 
is damaged by the lack of uniformity being present in branches of law as tax law123, competition law, 
industrial IP law, bankruptcy law etc124. Accordingly, due to the absence of uniformity, legal 
uncertainty diffuses, as well as heterogeneity125. When one desires to convert to SE does not really 
know the exact legal frame in which he/she is going to operate, nor his/her obligations. In other 
words, there is a direct deviation from art.50 (2§g)126 TFEU’s goals. The rationale of this provision is 
to erase at the highest level possible the existence of different national rules that possibly can 
discourage individuals of the right of establishment, and, equally important to deter third parties 
from non-interacting with companies seating in other States. Thus, renationalisation is an enormous 
setback127. The European legal order contradicts itself by allowing the creation of 27 SEs when it 
preaches as an ultimate objective the uniformity via enaction of the Regulation. 
(b) Law Arbitrage 
 
Subsequently, the above-stated facts create an adverse additive effect, as well. Due to the emerging 
of different nationally related SEs companies, the motive for “forum, or country shopping” is forged 
in the EU128.  
As it was stated above, the Regulation leaves gaps in core subjects as directors’ liability, insolvency, 
and criminal provisions etc129. So, the management of a company, obeying its interests, will opt for 
 
121Perakis, supra para 17, p.13, Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 240 
122 C. Wilk, supra p. 4, Prof. Perakis is an advocate of the latter interpretation of the legal status of SEs and their place in 
the EU Law. E. Perakis, supra para 155, p. 94, A. Tzouni, supra p. 197, J.Marychurch, supra p. 90-91, C. Dickens, supra p. 
1424, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 61,  
123E. Perakis, supra para 138 and 162, p. 80 and 98, J. Schmidt, supra p. 9, Christiane Malke, supra p. 16 
124Preamble n.20 of the Regulation, E. Perakis, supra para16, p.12, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 32, D. Gialouris,” Τονομικό 
πλαίσιοίδρυσης και φορολόγησηςτηςΕυρωπαϊκής ΑνώνυμηςΕταιρίας”, ΔΦΝ 60, p. 333 
125E. Perakis, supra para 17, p.13 
126The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties devolving upon them under the preceding 
provisions, in particular: (…) (g) by coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests 
of members and others, are required by Member States of companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of 
Article 54 with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Union; 
127E. Perakis, supra para 17, p.13 
128L. Enriques, suprap. 79-80, 82-83, J. Kirshner, supra p. 449-450, S. Mock, supra para 17-20, 4-5, J. Kirshner, supra, Article 
2, p. 1327-1328, H. Birkmose, supra p. 1075, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 52 
129 J. Kirshner, supra p. 463, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Lars Hornuf, supra p. 5, M.Stollt and S.Vitols, supra p. 12 
SPILIOTIS E. IOANNIS                                                                                                                                                                                                25 
 
the country to establish its SE, that provides the more suitable and preferable legal regime for its 
activities. Subsequently, national legislators will adopt the same provisions to follow the trend. 
Despite the intended universality of the SE initiative, SEs are suitable for the most attractive legal 
regime. This a crucial deterrent factor, since it could give the incentive to MSs to compete in a 
negative way for the internal market. This is not an entirely new practice. The world’s richest 
company, Apple, signed “a lucrative secret agreement with Ireland that enabled it to avoid taxes not 
just in Ireland but globally130”. This is a typical example of how an MS is willing to create an image of 
corporate heaven unfairly against the others.  
In other words, the competition of regimes and the subsequent “forum shopping, or Delaware Effect” 
are likely to vitiate the ulterior objective of the Regulation which is stated to be the completion of 
the internal market with no barriers131. The desired European dimension remains a utopia. The 
Regulation provides for another tool for antagonism. MS engage in a race to the bottom allowing 
more corporate autonomy132. And surely MSs such as Germany, France are more likely to attract 
more companies because their legal orders are internationally more knowledgeable133 than Greece’s 
for instance. 
In addition, the concept of corporate mobility, an enormous advantage according to the Regulation’s 
supporters, is severely affected by the dependence on national law. Existing SEs companies are 
reluctant to change their seat of administration from one state to another because simultaneously 
the applicable law is to be changed134. 
This a matter is not to be taken lightly. The alteration of the subsidiary law must be examined closely 
by the company’s legal department. This is translated in its balance sheet as more costs and legal 
 
130J.Stiglitz, ‘The EURO- HOW A COMMON CURRENCY THREATENS THE FUTURE of EUROPE 2018’, introduction to the 
paperback edition, NORTON, NY, p.xxv 
131Preamble n. 1 and 7 of the Regulation 
132A company, when it examines the preferred location to be established in, will select the one with the preferable political 
and social conditions. On the contrary, another point of view states that the corporate law competition leads to nowhere 
in particular. Bratton, ′Corporate Law′s Race to Nowhere in Particular′(1994) 44, University of Toronto Law Journal, p. 
401, C. Rose, supra p. 112, H. Birkmose, supra p. 1081, D. Siclari, supra p. 3 
133E. Perakis, supra para 160, p. 97 
134T.Papadopoulos, supra p.46, W. Ringe names the partial law deviations as subsidiary law changes.  W. Ringe, supra p. 
186 
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uncertainty, while, simultaneously, even more obligations may arise for the shareholders, as 
potential elimination of him/her stated in the statute135.  
( c) Limited and expensive formation formula 
The Regulation, directly applicable to all MSs, enables an organization to convert into an SE with strict 
conditions. 
Firstly, according to art.2, there are strictly only four possible ways of forming (numerus clausus136) a 
European Company137. Specifically, those are the merger of corporations of different MS, by creating 
a joint venture between companies from different MS, or by the creation of an SE subsidiary, or by 
the conversion of a company to an SE if it had for at least two years a branch under another 
jurisdiction138. 
This illustrates clearly the inability of a new entity from its composition to emerge and embark on its 
activities as an SE139. On the contrary, there must be a coordination of two entities, to validate an SE, 
and more importantly, the cross-border element must be present140. Therefore, it is not possible to 
create an SE ex nihilo141. Thus, an SE cannot be formed “in any situation, from anyone, natural, or 
legal persons142”. Also, with the adoption of the Regulation, some other peculiarities are present. 
 
135Perakis, supra p.51, Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 239-240 
136J.Schmidt, supra p.3, A. Tzouni, supra p. 197, 206 
137Lenoir, supra p.17, D. Hrabanek, supra p. 33, J.Marychurch, supra p. 88, C. Dickens, supra p. 1427, Ernst &Young, supra 
chapter 3, p. 253-256, C.Teichmann, supra p. 311, T. Papadoloulos, supra p. 33-35, Έκθεσητης Επιτροπής, supra p. 7-8 
138 For more technical aspects of the SE formation SeeDirk van Gerven and Paul Storm, suprap. 7,29,35, 37-54, Ernst & 
Young, supra p. 55-72, “Another provision, debatably creating a fifth means of  formation, extends the right to take part 
in the formation of an SE to companies with head offices outside the European Union”.P. Piane, supra p.9-10,E. Perakis, 
supra para 29, p. 20, J.Schmidt, supra p.3, S. Lombardo & P.Pasotti, supra p. 174, Vagts and T. Waelde, supra p.823, L. 
Teodorescu, supra p. 700, C. Rose, supra p. 113, C. Dickens, supra p. 1429-1457, F. Ichay and M Schocher, supra p. 165, 
G. Van Eck and E. R. Roelofs, supra p. 106-107, E.R. Roelofs, supra p.144, B. Keller, supra p. 428, D.Siclari, supra p. 1, A. 
Schulz and K. Eicker, supra p. 334 
139E. Perakis, supra para 2, p.2, According to the Ernst & Young Study, the SE is not quite attractive due to the higher 
prerequisites that an SE must fulfill compared to a domestic company, which has a simpler system to comply with.  Ernst 
& Young, supra p. 77, B. Keller, ibid 
140A. Tzouni, supra p. 206 
141N.Lenoir, supra p. 17, A. Tzouni, supra p. 196, 206, T. Papadopoulos, supra p.34-35, Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3,  p. 
257,278 
142E. Perakis, supra para 29, p. 20, J.Schmidt, supra p.3 
SPILIOTIS E. IOANNIS                                                                                                                                                                                                27 
 
Firstly, the above article allows only Public limited-liability companies (hereafter PLC) referred to in 
Annex I and II to convert into an SE143. 
 
Thus, the inability of natural persons and other types of corporations is clarified, to form an SE144 
hindering the probability of further growth and progress of the institution as a commercial type. 
Therefore, “the reorganization of their business on a Community-scale” that exceeds “purely local 
needs” is not for anyone145. 
Apart from the above, SE is a corporation type available only for the big corporation and national 
champions, the ones eager to extend their market share. The reason for the criticism is article 4, 
which states that an SE must possess more than 120,000 EUR capital146. Thus, the required start-up 
capital is not possible for the average company, especially small size undertakings147. This way the 
Regulation silently excludes quite a few corporations that desire to expand but are unable to 
compete with entities with financially better balance sheets. One might even argue that there is a 
question of violation of equality and to the freedom of establishment148. This is peculiar since the 
European Legislator invests a significant amount of manpower and recourses trying to decrease 
competition and the creation of national champions in its own area. Instead, it gives the impression 
 
143Ι. Κ. Ρόκας, suprapara 475, p.233, P. Piane, supra p.10, Art. 17 addresses only Public Limited Liability Companies 
excluding primary Private Limited Companies.F.Ichay andM.Schocher, supra p. 168, N. Lenoir, supra art.2 p. 117, P.Pelle, 
supra p. 285 
144Perakissupra para 29, p.20, C. Wilk, supra p. 4 
145Preamble 1, Κ.Ρόκας, suprapara 475, p.233 
146  The amount is that high because SE’s shareholders are liable up to that minimum capital. 2. Dirk van Gerven and 
Paul Storm, supra vol.Ip. 31, M. Stollt and S. Vitols, supra p. 11,A. Tzouni, supra p. 206, J. Schmidit, supra p.7-8, S. 
Lombardo & P. Pasotti, supra p. 174, D. Hrabanek, supra p. 34, L. Teodorescu, supra p. 700, F. Ichay and M Schocher, 
suprap. 166, P.Pelle, supra p. 285, A.Schulz,K.Eicker, supra p. 334, 2. Dirk van Gerven and Paul Storm, supra vol.II p. 
34-35,  
147Thirteenth Recital of the Regulation,Prof. Perakis argues that the capital expenses are not large enough to hinder access 
to SEs by smaller corporations, E. Perakis, supra para 21, p. 14-15, The conducted survey of  Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas 
Engert, Lars Hornuf in 2009 seemed to agree with the opinion of Prof.Perakis stating that as of 2009 “data reveals that 
the SE is frequently used by small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)”. Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Lars Hornuf, 
supra p. 17. on the contrary, J. Schmidt gives the example of German capital requirement that is a minimum of 50,000, a 
significantly less amount than the one for an SE. J. Schmidt, supra p. 8, Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) represent 
more than 99 per cent of the companies in the European Union (EU), Kuriakh Noussia, ‘European private company 
(societasprivataeuropaea) (2010) 11’, Business Law International,iss.3, p. 277, C. Wilk, supra p. 5, Mathias Siems, “The 
European Private Company: an attractive new legal form of doing business?”, (2009) 5 JIBFL 247, p. 2, Ernst & Young, 
supra p. 77, 169, H. Fleischer, supra p.1676, Dirk van Gerven and Paul Storm, supra p. 154, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 26 
148Art. 43 states that “restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of 
another Member State shall be prohibited. (.…) Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue 
activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings”, 
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that on the one hand does not allow domestic champions, but on the other seeks to create trans-
European ones.  
In addition to the strict formation criteria, another negative factor is the quite expensive setup costs. 
Overall, the average expenses for an SE are calculated to be about 784.000 Euros including the tax 
and legal advisory, translations of legal documents, and registration, whereas the total amount can 
skyrocket up to 4 million149. Notable examplesare the formation of Allianz SE and BASF SE, whose 
costs for conversion to an SE amounted to €95 million and €5 million respectively150. Those examples 
clearly illustrate the inability of average entities to take advantage of the Regulation. 
(d) Siege reel/inflexibility 
Another characteristic that hinderers the consolidation of the institution is the adoption in art. 7 of 
the real seat theory (or siege reel)151. The notion of this principle is the following: when a company is 
legally registered in a specific state, its place of administration must be in the same place152. The 
reason of the adoption of the real seat theory is “to avoid the propensity of companies towards 
countries in which legal regulations are less strict153” and more importantly to enhance the legal 
certainty and avoid administrative difficulties arising for the situation of having the two offices 
separately in different states154. The legislator realized the potential disadvantageous position for 
MSs that adopted the real seat against others that did not. Again, this was a compromise from the 
Commission opting for not making the issue a conflict of law rules matter. However, the freedom of 
establishment is hindered155. 
 
149Έκθεση της Επιτροπής,supra p.5, KenWoffenden, supra p. 2 
150Έκθεση της Επιτροπής, ibid, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Lars Hornuf, supra p.6,  A.Tzouni, supra p. 206, Ernst 
& Young, supra chapter 3,  p. 240 
151Dirk van Gerven and Paul Storm, suprap. 11,L. Sasso, supra p. 161, J. Kirshner, supra p. 463, W. Ringe states that in 
reality the Regulation does not adopt specifically the real seat theory but something in between it and the incorporation 
theory, W. Ringe, supra p. 188-189, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 44, F. Drinhausen and N. Nohlen, suprap. 14, S. Deakin, 
supra p. 81, A. Schulz and K.Eicker, supra p. 333, C.Teichmann, supra p. 313, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 41 
152Commission considered this model to be in accordance with the theory of the real seat, at the time and was convinced 
that it helped to apply the subsidiary law, W. Ringe, supra p. 188, 195, E. Perakis, supra para 74, p. 43, A. Tzouni, supra  
p. 200, 206, J, Schmidt, supra p. 5, C. Dickens, supra p. 1428, C.Cathiard, supra p. 34, Dirk van Gerven and Paul Storm, 
suprap. 33 
153N. Lenoir, supra p.18,  
154J.Marychurch, supra  p. 89, For F.Ichay and M.Schocher there is tax reason behind the provision of art. 7 of the 
Regulation with no further justification though.F. Ichay and M Schocher, supra p. 167 
155W.Ringe, supra p. 186, E. Perakis, supra para 74, p.44, S. Lombardo & P. Pasotti, supra p. 181, C.. Dickens, supra p. 
1462, F. Drinhausen and N. Nohlen, supra p. 15-16, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.I, p. 11, 
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After a collective review of the Regulation "the real seat theory" adopted in art.7 obliges the head 
office to be in the same MS as the regulatory office creating enormous problems156. Therefore, the 
Regulation is characterized by inflexibility due to the quite a few prerequisites to be applied such as 
the dependence on the employees’ approval. For instance, there is the right of shareholders 
opposing the transfer to make the company repurchase their shares that creates a quite complex 
regime157. 
 
It was expressed above that art.8 allows an SE can transfer its seat to another MS. However, this 
advantage is underestimated by the obligatory transfer of the central administration when the head 
office is relocated158. Indisputably, the purpose of this provision is to enable the state’s control over 
entities operating within its territory, but on the other hand, there is a costly physical movement of 
equipment and personnel thereof. Not only that but article 66, paragraph 1, provides for a mandatory 
waiting period of two years before the immigrated SE can be transformed into a national corporate 
entity159. So, the procedure becomes extremely strict and complex making it difficult for a company 
to choose the adoption of the Regulation. This, of course, is a source of extra waste of the corporate 
capital increasing the cost of the transfer. In other words, the central administration must balance 
the advantages and the disadvantages, and more important to examine whether the organization is 
able to bear the cost.  
 
Moreover, the transfer of seat leads to a subsequent change of the applicable law, as art. 9 indicates, 
another fact that causes huge drawbacks160. Basically, the relevant national law is of great 
 
156Also, the Regulation goes even further allowing States to oblige their SEs to locate the head office and registered office 
in the same area. One State that transposed this provision is Austria, Ernst & Young, supra p. 73, E.Perakis, supra para 74, 
p.43, S. Lombardo & P. Pasotti, supra p. 174, L. Enriques, supra p. 80-81 
157 Preamble 24 states the following: “Adequate protection of the interests of the minority shareholders who oppose the 
transfer, of creditors and of holders of other rights should be proportionate. Such transfer should not affect the rights 
originating before the transfer”. For more See A. Grumberg andC. Le Gall-Robinson, suprap. 745,C.Teichmann, supra p. 
32-322, Jodie A Kirshner, supra p. 464, C. Dickens, supra p. 1462, The French law requires a unanimous decision of the 
shareholders regarding a potential transfer of seat. Ernst & Young, supra p. 48, 295, 371, 488, 515 
158“The company is neither allowed to solely transfer its head office abroad nor is it allowed to transfer its registered office 
into another Member State while leaving the head office behind”, W. Ringe, supra p. 188, 202, J. Kirnshner states that 
many companies would have considered transferring as long as they did not also have to move their headquarters . J. 
Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1314, F.Drinhausen and N.Nohlen, supra p. 15 
159C. Wilk, supra p. 31 
160S. Lombardo & P. Pasotti, supra p. 182, E. Perakis, supra para 86, p. 51, W. Ringe, supra p.202, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul 
Strom, supra vol.I, p. 11-12, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 43-44 
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importance, since it governs a variety of topics, such as tax law etc161. So, it is quite possible that the 
new applicable domestic law to impose further and stricter provisions that must be complied.  
 
In addition, the same article is considered to overprotect shareholders, creditors and employees162. 
However, the primary goal of corporate movement shall not be obstructed by overprotecting 
provisions, otherwise, SEs may try to find less protective legal orders163. Over protectionism creates 
further obstacles. 
 
In the same context, the Regulation does not establish the creation of a new European commercial 
register, as it should. On the contrary, SEs must be registered in the national commercial register 
creating trammels with the national law. As of today, there is not an initiative regarding the 
enactment of a European Register, even though there are many scholars stress its importance164. 
This allows the censures of the SEs to argue that article 7 acts as “counter-regulation165”, because it 
sets the Regulation in a disadvantaged position. Basically, despite the development of the case-law, 
the Regulation persists on anachronistic approaches. The outcome is to be in a disadvantageous 
position in relation to domestic corporations, like in the U.K to the British Ltd companies166.  
 
In other words, the Regulation hinders itself and does not allow the SE to progress as a corporate 
type. Not only that but art. 64 places the real seat theory as a legal requirement167 of the company 
and any deviations of the principle provoke the home MS to “act to take appropriate measures”. W. 
 
161T. Papadopoulos, ibid 
162An SE's shareholders and creditors shall be entitled, at least one month before the general meeting called upon to 
decide on the transfer, to examine at the SE's registered office the transfer proposal and the report drawn up pursuant to 
paragraph 3 and, on request, to obtain copies of those documents free of charge. (..)A Member State may, in the case of 
SEs registered within its territory, adopt provisions designed to ensure appropriate protection for minority shareholders 
who oppose a transfer. (..)Before the competent authority issues the certificate mentioned in paragraph 8, the SE shall 
satisfy it that, in respect of any liabilities arising prior to the publication of the transfer proposal, the interests of creditors 
and holders of other rights in respect of the SE (including those of public bodies) have been adequately protected in 
accordance with requirements laid down by the Member State where the SE has its registered office prior to the transfer, 
(..). C.Cathiard, supra p. 25-26, 81-82, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 44 
163Caspar Rose argues that desired by many investor’s protection as a key to enhance corporate trust is confronted by 
recent and historic examples that proves that to be wrong. For more SeeC. Rose, supra p. 113, W.GRinge, supra p. 203-
205, K. Oplustil, supra p. 122-123, J.Marychurch, supra p. 96, J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1306-1307, 1318, F.Drinhausen 
andN.Nohlen, supra p. 19 
164Α. Γαβριηλίδης, ‘Κοινοτικό Δίκαιο & Εμπορικό Δίκαιο (2007)’, NB, p. 98-111 
165S. Lombardo and P.Pasotti, supra p.12 
166E. Perakis, supra p.44, PLCs in Great Britain were increased from 3.460 on 1996 to 22.970 on 2005, Α. Γαβριηλίδης, 
supra p.99 
167E. Perakis p.45, F.Drinhausen andN.Nohlen, supra p. 14 
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Ringe and others state that in the light of case-law168, there may be a violation of primary EC primary 
legislation169. So, the adoption of the real seat theory acts as an obstacle for the progress of the 
institution, something that the Legislator must solve170.  
( e) Time-consuming, inflexible, costly and vague context 
 
Also, there is a causal link between the lack of publicity of the Regulation and the time consuming, 
costly procedures and the often-vague text of the Statute171.  
 
When one company examines the possibility of converting to an SE, it will realize that there is a need 
for unanimous approval from its employees that will likely hinder the process due to the lengthy 
negotiations. This a time-consuming requirement, when one realizes that in a case of a merger the 
economic factors are constantly changing. Nowadays, with the deployment of technology start-up 
companies, the spectrum of time in an agreement reflects the sustainability of a corporation. The 
stagnation and the dependence on different bodies, like the “special negotiation party”, does not 
favour the Regulation172.  
Furthermore, art. 8(14)173 of the Regulation operates as an additional obstacle to corporate mobility 
due to the prediction of the power of an MS to opposite to a transfer of seat on public interest’s 
 
168Meaning recentECJdecisionssuchas Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art. 
169W.G. Ringe, supra p. 186, 188, O. Khomenko, supra p. 17 
170As for the anticipation of Prof. Perakis was false that the adoption may be temporary, because of the revision of the 
Regulation after 5 year since the adoption. (art.69) 
171Έκθεσητης Επιτροπής, supra p.5,B. Ballester& M. del Monte,supra p. 17, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.I p. 8, 
Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3,  p. 239-241 
172J.Schmidt, supra p. 10, K. Oplustil, supra p. 114, Partner RE did not convert to an SE due to the exposure to employee 
participation and tax uncertainty,  J. Kirshner, supra p. 455, 458, A.Grumber and; C. Le Gall-Robinson, supra p. 751-754, 
O. Khomenko, supra p. 17, C. Wilk, supra p. 28,30,  J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1336, Ernst & Young, supra p. 372, 488, 
E. Roelofs, supra p. 121, V.Snijder. & A. Dorresteijn, supra p. 24, B. Keller, supra p. 428-431, S. Deakin, p. 90, Moreover, 
“the procedure is similar to that for mergers: a transfer proposal, publication, a justificatory report, a waiting period of 
two months, a decision by the general meeting, protection of creditors and possibly minority shareholders, a certificate 
from a competent authority, registration in the host Member 
Stateonlyaftersubmissionofthecertificateandproductionofevidencethatthe formalities required for registration in that 
country have been completed (what formalities?), and publication again. All these formalities take time and effort”. Dirk 
V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.I p. 12, In France the involvement of the SNB is considered an enourmous drawback, 
Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.2 p. 151, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 38 
173Art. 8 par. 14 states “The laws of a Member State may provide that, as regards SEs registered in that Member State, 
the transfer of a registered office which would result in a change of the law applicable shall not take effect if any of that 
Member State's competent authorities opposes it within the two-month period referred to in paragraph 6. Such opposition 
may be based only on grounds of public interest. Where an SE is supervised by a national financial supervisory authority 
according to Community directives the right to oppose the change of registered office applies to this authority as well. 
Review by a judicial authority shall be possible”. 
SPILIOTIS E. IOANNIS                                                                                                                                                                                                32 
 
grounds174.   So, it is feasible to assume that the Regulation poses a variety of restrictions on 
corporate mobility. Not only that, but a lot of MSs have already made use of the right to oppose175. 
So, after the initiation of the transfer and the payment of costs a MS may stop the process affecting 
directly the survival of the business176. Surely, there may be a lot of players in the market who desire 
to transfer but due to the fear of this right, they never proceed to the actual transfer. 
 
Another issue increasing the inflexibility is the frequency of meetings of the board of directors and 
the subsequent briefing to the board of auditors177. In other words, there are tenacity and 
persistence technical issues, hindering the occupation with essential activities of a business. Another 
example is the “double-checking” of the formation of an SE via merger. Art. 25 forecasts that the MS, 
to which the merging company is subject, shall scrutinize the legality of a merger, whereas art.26 
par.1 allows the MS of the potential future establishment to do the same as far as the completion of 
the merger178. This may cost more effort, money and mostly time.  
 
In addition, the regulation lacks adequate information regarding several crucial facts that the 
interesting parties would desire to know before any actions taken thereto. Indeed, the insufficient 
information about SE Regulation is referred in the Commission’s Report179as “the most significant 
problem in the running of the SE”.This is the reality, because of the necessity of further “explaining 
the nature of the SE to business partners (customers, suppliers, banks etc.) and employees”. So, it is 
logical to assume that the management must be absolute of the utility of converting to an SE before 
proceeding to the procedural aspects. Reality shows that the management body is not willing to use 
resources to that very end, especially when there is present “a lack of hindsight and practical 
experience of the advisors and competent public authorities are reported as the most important 
 
174W. Ringe, supra p. 205, F.Drinhausen andN.Nohlen, supra p. 18-19, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra p. 9 
175Netherlands, France, Belgium, Spain and Great Britain, W.Rigne, ibid, C.Cathiard, supra p. 26,  
176T. Papadopoulos, p. 31, Commission Staff Working Document-Accompanying document to the Report, supra., p. 13 
177T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 30 
178Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.I p. 9, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 38, P.Pelle, supra p. 285, Ernst & Young, supra 
p. 296 
179Έκθεσητης Επιτροπής, supra p.5, “Many of our German interview partners mentioned that company registers, tax 
authorities and other government agencies are largely unfamiliar with the SE, making incorporation and operating the 
firm fairly difficult in some cases”.Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Lars Hornuf, supra p. 21 
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negative drivers when establishing an SE180”. This problem is illustrated by Ken Woffenden, who 
states that the UK business environment is unaccustomed to the concept of the two-tier system181. 
 
Also, linguistic and translation are to be tolerated. According to the Regulation, the merger’s plan 
and proposals must be translated in both languages increasing this way the cost and time frame of 
the procedure, while a notary must be used talking sufficiently both languages, something not quite 
easy in the European multilingual society182. Not only that, but some states forbid the use of bilingual 
operation merger plans increasing the difficulty and complexity of the conversion to an SE183.  
 
As for the vagueness and haziness of the Regulation, there are quite a few examples. With the 
examination of the Statute, one realizes that there some notions and concepts that are simply stated 
but need further interpretation. The necessity of additional commentary is related mostly on the 
dependence on national law. So, since there are 28 different SE companies in EU, some notions are 
interpreted differently resulting in more legal uncertainty.  
 
For example, the repetitive concepts of subsidiary and head office, are not defined through the 
Regulation leaving the definition on the national order184. Another example is that there no provision 
regulating the formation process of a subsidiary SE, or no description of the form of the draft terms 
of holding SE must comply 185. Due to the absence of an analytical framework, there is a diversion of 
opinions. More specifically, one could argue that it is most likely that the participating companies 
that form a subsidiary shall redeem the subsidiary’s shares, whereas another could argue that they 
could form a subsidiary “through national or cross-border disruption186. 
 
 
180ΈκθεσητηςΕπιτροπής, ibid, In the Ernst and Young study, the precedent lack of experience as regards the rules 
applicable to SEs in Cyprus and Czech Republic is considered a negative driver on the attractiveness of the SE 
institution.Ernst & Young, supra p. 135, 170, 340, 712, Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 239, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 
26 
181 Ken Woffenden, supra p. 2 
182A famous example is Elcoteq, a company which struggled during the negotiations due to the different spoken languages 
of the representatives from Baltic subsidiaries. J. Kirshner supra Article 2, p. 1321 
183T. Papadopoulos, supra p.39 
184K. Oplustil, supra p. 110-111, 113, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.Ip. 8,13, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 36 
185T. Papadopoulos, supra p.42, J.Marychurch, supra p. 93, 95, L. Teodorescu, supra p. 701 
186T. Papadopoulos, ibid 
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Also, art.8 (14) does not provide for an explicit definition of the “public grounds” that allow a State 
to exercise its right to oppose a transfer of seat resulting in different interpretations187. Thus, when 
there is not crystal-clear interpretation and it is up to the Member States to clarify the different legal 
notions, the MSs will proceed to the above task according to their own legal basis hindering the 
development of European Law188.  
 
( f) Potential spread of Systemic Risk 
 
Another negative factor, when it comes to the SEs, mostly for the Eurozone, is the fact that the SE’s 
subsidiaries are more interconnected than the normal subsidiaries of a company, because of the 
stronger links with the parent company.  
 
Of course, the potent interconnectedness is a significant advantage regarding the governance of the 
organization. However, the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 saw us that the outspread of systemic 
risk of banking and corporate entities is something not to be taken lightly. In other words, while a 
normal corporation’s subsidiary is an independent entity governed by the law of its establishment 
and not the one applicable for the parent company, an SE subsidiary is more interconnected. This 
phenomenon can create easily financial, or others, problems for the corporation making the entity 
to be potentially affected by more than one national economies. The probability of spreading is quite 
high.  
 
 
 
 
187According to W. Ringe, states that “commentators and national legislators find various different aspects they think are 
covered by “public grounds”. Mainly, aspects of tax, administrative and competition law are put forward. Some authors 
suggest that Article 8(14) of the Regulation should apply if employment issues are threatened. Others understand by 
“public interest” only questions of public security or defence. The Dutch legislator, however, discusses situations where a 
privatized undertaking having a public duty is about to transfer its seat into another Member State. The Swedish legislator 
mentions many different aspects, such as effective tax supervision, conservation of media plurality, consumer protection 
and prevention of money laundering”. W. Ringe, supra p. 205-206, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 44 
188 “A lawyer counseled an executive search company not to convert to the SE because regulators in Eastern Europe would 
block the conversion of Eastern European subsidiaries into branches, viewing the restructuring as a means for taking 
money out of the region”, J. Kirshner, supra Interview #47, p. 460 
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CHAPTER III : PROPOSALS 
The existence of weaknesses does not mean that the SE, as an institution, is doomed to fail per se. 
However, after the aforementioned analysis of the advantages and drawbacks of the SE corporate 
type, it is crystal clear the need for amendment of the Regulation is mandatory. What is quite 
surprising that, despite the legislative reference in art. 69 of the Regulation that proposals would 
have been made, nothing ever happened189. Commission felt that it was not the time for further 
negotiations and new compromises were not possible. 
Unquestionably, alteration proposals of the legal provisions of the Regulations shall not concern only 
the mentioned drawbacks, but the improvement of its positive characteristics as well.   
(a) Formation Formula 
Firstly, as it was stated earlier190, the strict criteria (numerus clausus) and the quite complex 
procedure, mostly because of the mandatory agreement with the employees191are hindering the 
Regulation' popularity192. Thus, it is logical for the companies to demand further changes with the 
goal of reduction of these obstacles.  
Besides, according to J. Schmidt193 , those obstacles are easily avoidable due to the emergence of 
shelf companies194, that an interesting party can acquire easily, or else if it has the time to set up a 
domestic company and use it to establish an SE.  
 
189Five years at the latest after the entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall forward to the Council and 
the European Parliament a report on the application of the Regulation and proposals for amendments, where appropriate. 
(..), W. Ringe, supra p. 200, F.Drinhausen andN.Nohlen, supra p. 15 
190See section … 
191S. Lombardo & P. Pasotti, supra p. 174,A. Tzouni, supra p. 206, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.I p. 35, 54,70, 
Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3,  p. 241, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 25 
192This is the reason why in Liechtenstein there are no SEs registered due to the complexity applicable ruler compared to 
the liberal ones for the domestic types. Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.II, p. 410,  E. Roelofs, supra p. 122, 
S.Lombardo & P. Pasotti, ibid, A. Tzouni, ibid 
193J. Schmidt, supra p. 3-5,15 
194J. Kirshmer, supra p. 469, J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1322, In an interesting case in Germany, on 30 March 2009, a 
court refused to register the SE as it was in conflict with Article 12, paragraph 2 SE Regulation, because the participating 
companies had no employees ,and therefore an SNB could not be formed and an agreement on the involvement of 
employees in the SE was lacking. On the appeal this decision was overturned. The Oberlandesgericht held that the lower 
judicial authorities – the Amtsgericht and the Landgericht – had unjustly decided not to register the SE due to a lack of an 
arrangement on the involvement of employees.E. Roelofs, “Shelf SEs and Employee Participation (2010) 7”, European 
Company Law, iss. 3, p.120-126, V.Snijder. & A. Dorresteijn, suprap. 24, T. Papadopoulos, supra p. 56-57 
SPILIOTIS E. IOANNIS                                                                                                                                                                                                36 
 
Thus, the numerus clausus of formation it is an unnecessary, complex and costly system that needs 
a proper modification on the grounds that it is easily preventable and therefore superfluous. Why 
keep obligations that are avoidable using loopholes and allow a institution that is inflexible? 
So, imperative is the need for further ways of formation. Besides, when one desires to create a legal 
entity which is directly connected with the EU, it is quite obscure not to be able to create this entity 
with further ways as a takeover, the most common tactic of formation195. In that context, another 
potential change in art.17 would be the allowance of other corporate types except for LLCs to convert 
to SEs196. This alteration is quite significant, on the ground that with increasing the scope of 
application more companies will acquire the European I.D and the other legal consequences. 
Accordingly, another proposal would broaden the scope of application to mergers, “where an SE is 
formed through a partial contribution of assets (a branch of activity)”. The outcome will be for the 
SE to engage in transnational activities197. Not only that, but with more SEs in the EU, more progress 
will be occurred in the Union, since it could be easier to compete with global industries established 
in the USA, or India. Consequently, there would be a reduction of unemployment with new jobs 
opened in the MSs. Furthermore, another proposal regarding the formation of SE is the annulment, 
or reduction, of the 2 years period of establishment of a subsidiary, or a branch. Via the flourishing 
of this proposition, the formation of an SE will be easier for any organization. There is no need for 
complex procedural restrictions198. Also, the elimination of the prerequisite of multiple states of 
origin as a condition of formation is of utmost significance. Besides, years have shown that most are 
domestic the reasons to convert to an SE199. In addition, possible allowance of creation SE ex nihilo 
by individuals, or by division is another option.  
As far as the capital minimum of 120.000 Euros, which hinders the probability of converting to an SE 
for smaller corporations, a reduction must be made. Indeed, one may argue that this large amount 
affects the ratio of SEs in MSs stigmatized that their economy is more fragile than others. For 
 
195E. Perakis, supra para 169, p. 103 
196 P. Piane, supra p.10, Art. 17 addresses only Public Limited Liability Companies excluding primary Private Limited 
Companies. F.Ichay andM.Schocher, supra p. 168, N. Lenoir, supra p. 117, P.Pelle, supra p. 285, C.Cathiard, supra p. 86, 
Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 254, 278-279, 281, C.Teichmann, supra p. 312 
197 Ernst & Young, “supra chapter 3, p. 281 
198A. Tzouni, supra p. 206, Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 278-279 
199 Study Group for German Stock Corporation and Capital Markets Law, 'The Eight Most Important Recommendations 
for Modification Of The SE Regulation' (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law Review, p. 285 
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example, the imposed capital controls in Greece as an outcome of the recent financial crisis does not 
create the condition to highlight the potential benefits of establishing in.  
Lastly, another amendment would be the elimination of art.12, para 12 of the Regulation which 
connects the creation of the SE with the involvement of its employees delaying the completion and 
increases the time frame200. And as for the right to oppose of art. 19 must be permitted to MS that 
has the same option for internal mergers201. 
(b) Achieving Harmonization/the Freedom of Establishment 
The adoption of the real seat theory was justified earlier as a huge drawback202. 
So, it is logical that alteration must be made with the abolishment of Art. 7 and art.64. More 
specifically, there must be an annulment of the restriction of granting nationality to a company only 
if it has both its registered office and place of administration within the same jurisdiction203. There 
are arguments in favour of the real seat doctrine stating that the stakeholders, customers and 
creditors will be better protected in case of a company being subject to the law of its 
establishment204. Or even that this principle prevents companies from finding more lenient legal 
orders205. However, this argument is outdated, since the emergence of new technologies, or the 
transnational operations, the cross-border element is present in all transactions, and forum shopping 
already exists in EU as stated above. 
It was stressed already that companies are reluctant to change their seat due to the complexity of 
the procedure206.  
So, it will be suitable for the Regulation to opt for the adoption of the incorporation doctrine207. 
According to it, any corporation receives recognition via the establishment in any MS and its internal 
 
200 Study Group, supra p. 285-286, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Lars Hornuf., supra p. 6-7, Ernst & Young, supra p. 
489, Ernst & Young, suprachapter 3, p. 281 
201 Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 283 
202 For moreSee section … ,J. Kirshner, supra p. 454, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.I p. 36 
203T. Papadopoulos, EU Company Law, PowerPoint presentations during 2019-2020 LLM program, N. Lenoir, supra p. 20-
21, E. Perakis, supra para 169, p. 103. W.Ringe, supra p. 196-198,200-202, Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 280 
204W. Ringe, supra p. 202,204 
205J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1286 
206Μ. Andenasand F. Wooldridge, ‘European Comparative Company Law2009’ (Cambridge University Press), p. 411. 
207L. Sasso, supra p. 161, W. Ringe, supra p. 188, S. Lombardo & P. Pasotti, supra p. 181, C.Cathiard, supra p. 34 
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affairs are subjected to the country of incorporation. This simplifies the business structure because 
the head office of an SE could be transferred within the EU with no restrictions. This way one 
company with the abolishment of art.7 could transfer its head office conforming with the obligations 
of art. 8 of the Regulation, or with no conforming with them at all and no alteration of the subsidiary 
jurisdiction would be made208. On the other hand, if the registered is office is to be transferred, the 
subsidiary law changes.  
 As for those who argue that this practice increases the “forum shopping”, it is stated that it is already 
happening without the incorporation theory being applicable209. After-effect of “the adoption of the 
incorporation theory is the increase of companies’ motility and it opened the way for the 
corporations’ establishment in MS with fewer requirements210”. Nevertheless, if there are some MS 
that insist on keeping the adoption of the real seat theory, and therefore to accept the subsequent 
consequences211, the Regulation could provide for the possibility of choosing between the opposite 
theories.This compromise is not something new. The option between one-tier, or two-tier system is 
a demonstrable example.  
Besides, the case-law212 of the Court illustrates clearly the acceptance of the separation of the 
registered office and head office making the adoption of real seat theory an anachronistic 
approach213. W. Ringe argues that its adoption is incompatible with EC Law and with freedom of 
establishment in the light of articles 3,95 and 308 TFEU214. Besides, preamble 1of the Regulation 
explicitly sets the target of the “completion of the internal market”, something that is hindered by 
the adoption of the real seat theory. The ECJ in Uberseering and Inspire Art. cases allowed the 
national corporations to have their head offices and registered offices in different states. So, why this 
does not apply for an SE? So, there is a clear contradiction215.  
 
208W. Ringe, supra p. 201 
209T. Papadopoulos, EU Company Law, PowerPoint presentations during 2019-2020 LLM program, A. Tzouni, supra p.207 
210A. Γαβριηλίδης, suprap. 99 
211Decrease of the number of SEs due to forum shopping. 
212Centros, Uberseering, Inspire Art and Cartesio. For more SeeC. Kersting and C.P Schindler, supra p. 4-5, T. 
Papadopoulos, supra p. 49-51 
213W. Ringe, supra p. 190, A. Tzouni, p. 207 
214W.Ringe, supra p. 190-195, T.Papadopoulos, EU Company Law, PowerPoint presentations during 2019-2020 LLM 
program 
215W. Ringe, supra p. 194, S. Lombardo & P. Pasotti, supra p. 183, C.Malke, supra p.50, C. Dickens, supra p. 1462-
1463,Florian Drinhausen, Nicolas Nohlen and C. Teichmann mention that most scholars have a different opinion. 
According to it, art.7(1) is inconformity with the EU Law, because the SE corporate type is not a domestic corporate type, 
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Furthermore, according to the German Group216, there must be a harmonization of employee 
participation thresholds in Directive 2001/86/EC. These percentages must be harmonized to avoid 
discrimination between SE and domestic corporate types, a principle established in art.10 of the 
Regulation. And they propose the application of art. 16, para 4, lit a of the Dir. 2005/56/EC for the 
same reason. Also, art.12 of the Regulation regarding the mandatory negotiation with employees 
prior to registration could be erased217. The protection of employees could be achieved via another 
way.  
Another critical aspect of creating issues is the mandatory simultaneous transfer of the registered 
office affecting the mobility of the corporation218. We clarified above, that corporate mobility is an 
enormous advantage of the SE corporate type, but as a benefit it can be further improved. A 
complimentary new Directive would be the solution to the problem allowing companies to move 
their seat easily with no further costs. legal certainty and simplify transfer procedures, thus saving 
costs219. 
( c) European business register specifically for SEs 
As of today, there is no European Register for SEs entities only domestic ones220. Thus, in the case of 
research, one must examine all national registers221. This is something needed to be changed because 
it is not compatible with the transnational character of SEs. 
 
but, on the contrary, is a supra-national one. It is a creation of Community Law, and, therefore, is cannot fall under caselaw 
relevant for domestic corporate types. However, the ECJ’s Gebhard Formula illustrates that freedom of establishment is 
denied if a cross-border activity becomes attractive. The combination of Art. 7 & 8 does that.C.Teichmann, supra p. 315, 
F.Drinhausen andN.Nohlen, supra p. 15-17, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom supra vol.I p. 11, 
216Composed by Prof. Dr Gregor Bachmann, Trier; Dr Thomas Bücker (Rechtsanwalt), Frankfurt; Prof. Dr Matthias Casper, 
Münster; Dr Hans-Christoph Ihrig (Rechtsanwalt), Frankfurt; Dr Dirk Jannott (Rechtsanwalt), Düsseldorf; Dr Roger Kiem 
(Rechtsanwalt), Frankfurt; Prof. Dr Carsten Schäfer, Mannheim; Dr Maximilian Schiessl (Rechtsanwalt), Düsseldorf; Prof. 
Dr Christoph Seibt(Rechtsanwalt), Hamburg; Prof. Dr Christoph Teichmann, Würzburg; Prof. Dr Rüdiger Veil, Hamburg; 
Prof. Dr Marc-Philippe Weller, Mannheim. German Group, supra p.286-287 
217 Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3, p. 281 
218C. Dickens, supra p. 1462 
219B. Ballester& M. del Monte, supra p. 38 
220 C. Wilk, supra p. 5, E. Perakis, supra para 154, p.93-94, C. Dickens, supra p. 1428, 1457, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, 
supra vol.I, p. 37, Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3,  p. 282 
221 Oleksandr Khomenko, suprap.17, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Lars Hornuf, supra p. 6 
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In this context, the purpose of Commercial Law is the adjustment of commercial legal relationships 
to facilitate economic activities. The proper facilitation of these activities needs velocity and 
execution222. Thus, the easiness in access to the public of the commercial register works to that end.  
Moreover, the public European Business Register (hereafter EBR) promotes legal certainty and 
security by providing critical information about the company. With the establishment of an EBR 
specifically for SEs, third parties will obtain information that nowadays is only available in national 
registers in which the SE is located223. For instance, for Greek companies, interested parties shall 
examine the relevant info in General Commercial Register (Γ.Ε.ΜΗ, hereafter GCR)224. One key 
problem with the webpage of the central database is that, if one switches the language to English, 
there is no option for research, but only general information about the goals and history of GCR. 
Thus, foreigners cannot be benefited by it.  
The creation of EBR is justified for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, it will facilitate the freedom 
of establishment (art.48 TFEU) and the conditions of the internal market, since corporations’ 
information will be available to everyone. Also, the transition from the real seat theory following the 
ECJ case-law of Centros, Uberseering and Inspire Art will be easier225.  
Accordingly, via EBR all data and national registers will be held in an electronic form allowing any 
interested party to examine them. The substantial publicity, simplification of the procedure, 
transparency and certification of authenticity will result in further EU’s progress226 and accrual of the 
number of third parties interacting with SEs. 
(  d) Achieving Unification 
One of the key issues of the Regulation is the dependence of SEs to the domestic applicable law. The 
volume of its dependency is so extreme as to question the characterization of SEs as a transnational 
 
222A. Γαβριηλίδης, suprap. 95 
223 Oleksandr Khomenko, supra p. 17, N. Lenoir, supra p. 117 
224'ΓΕΝΙΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΜΗΤΡΩΟ (Γ.Ε.ΜΗ.)' (Businessportal.gr, 2020) 
<http://www.businessportal.gr/Page/display_page/41> accessed 18 December 2019. 
225A. Γαβριηλίδης, suprap. 98-100 
226A. Γαβριηλίδης, supra p. 102-105 
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undertaking. It is not a pure supra-national corporate type yet. Thus, there must be a change with 
less reference to MS’s laws227. 
The main cause is the adoption of the renvoi (referral) technique. According to that technique, several 
points are left unregulated by the Regulation leaving the national law of establishment to fill the 
gaps. The outcome is the lack of uniformity. However, some argue that the existence of EU Law 
Directives and the subsequent transposition of them to the domestic legal orders offer a degree of 
uniformity228, but the SE regime proves them wrong as expressed earlier.  
Thus, the goal must be the enactment of the overall legal regime with no or little reference to national 
laws. This is the only way to achieve uniformity and therefore to increase the necessary legal certainty 
on the SEs229. The objective will be to allow provisions on the statute of an SE that are against the 
domestic mandatory law improving this way the freedom of the management. 
Nevertheless, uniformity needs equality. With no appetite for equality between MSs, the progress of 
SEs as a common institution is unreachable. The MSs themselves must work towards the efficacy of 
internal markets in which there are no borders. Reality shows that this far from true when one 
examines some states’ practice aiming to reap benefits in a worthless manner. For instance, no one 
can forget the eruption of the Ireland/Apple scandal as stated above230. Those practices indicate the 
horrible truth that the MSs competing with each other and some are operating with an obscure way. 
Overall, there is an increasing need for a switch of perceptions and politics231 to reduce the above-
stated situation. It is stated that further harmonization would attract enterprises from miscellaneous 
industries, such as telecommunications and pharmaceuticals232. 
(e )Taxes 
Finally, in the same context, a uniform tax regime must be promoted. This is highly important if one 
examines the prominent position of “forum shopping” in the SE corporate type233. Another reason 
 
227J.Marychurch, supra p. 104, C.Cathiard, supra p. 59 
228T.Papadopoulos,supra p. 27, C. Teichmann, suprap. 309, 316, E. Perakis, supra p.6 
229E. Perakis, supra para 169, p. 103 
230See section…. 
231J. E. Stiglitz, supra p. xxvi-xxviii 
232J. Kirshner, supra p. 460, J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1306-1307 
233 M. Tabaksblat, "The Case for a Single European Tax (1992) 4" International Tax Review, iss. 1,  p. 5-8, L. Sasso, supra 
p. 163-164, E.Perakis, supra para 138, p.80-82, J. Schmidt, supra p. 9, N. Lenoir, supra p. 20-21, J. Kirshner, supra p. 461-
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would be occurrences of an SE that has permanent establishment income in several states and had 
to pay taxes in all of them234. 
Moreover, due to the applicability of the renvoi technique and the variances of SEs from country to 
country, entities converting to an SE are opting a country for their establishment based on those 
differences. Thus, the more economic advantages an undertaking is to obtain in an MS, the more 
likely is to choose that state235. For this reason, the issue of taxes, as well as dividends, plays an 
enormous factor to the institution of SEs regarding its further attractiveness. There are MS with low 
corporate taxes like Estonia236, Ireland237 and Slovakia238 with a significant competitive advantage239. 
Also, some entities do not convert to an SE, or do not transfer their seat, despite the flexibility 
provided from another jurisdiction due to unpredictability of the tax systems240. Finally, the absence 
of uniformity hinders the main advantage of an SE, the corporate mobility, since there are legal 
domestic obstacles posed by national laws. For instance, Germany imposes relocating companies to 
pay full liquidation taxes despite the non-liquidation of the SE241. All these aspects and facts indicate 
the necessity of tax’s unification. 
 
462, In interviews subjects identified tax advantages as the main reason for convertion to an SE. Horst Eidenmüller, 
Andreas Engert, Lars Hornuf, supra p. 7-8, 22, Ken Woffenden, supra p. 2, F. Ichay and M.Schocher, suprap. 168-169, B. 
Keller, supra p. 435 
234S.Kadi, supra p. 12-13 
235Art.10 of the Regulation states “Subject to this Regulation, an SE shall be treated in every Member State as if it were a 
public limited-liability company formed in accordance with the law of the Member State in which it has its registered 
office”. So, in Greece an SE shall be treated as a Greek PLC as for tax issues and dividends.  FormoreSeeE. Perakis, supra 
para 138, p.80-81   
236With no tax on tetained earnings 
237 With a 12% tax rate 
238With 17% tax rate 
239J. Kirshner, supra p. 462, J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1309 
240Partner Re, a multinational reinsurance enterprise, transferred its seat to Ireland from Switzerland without converting 
to an SE because of tax non unification. Jodie A Kirshner, p. 458, In another article J. Kirshner argues that if there was a 
unified tax system, more companies would adopt the SE corporate type. J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1307, N. Lenoir, 
supra p. 117, C.Cathiard, supra p. 51, D. Gerven and P.Strom state that “if attractive tax rules for the SE can be created, 
Belgium will be able to retain the headquarters of some international groups”. Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.I, 
p. 173, 202, 236, According to the authors, the general uncertainty is the main cause of the lack of popularity of SEs in 
Norway, for instance. Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.II, p. 436, Ernst & Young, supra chapter 3,  p. 215, 230-232, 
238, 264-265, Daniel Gutmann, “The Transfer of the Registered Office of a European Company. Some Tax Thoughts from 
a French Perspective (2006) 34”, INTERTAX, Iss. 5, Kluwer Law International, p. 255-259 
241J. Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1316, F.Drinhausen andN.Nohlen, supra p. 17, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.I, 
p. 240 
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This proposal is not an idea entirely new242. The idea of common community taxation was to start 
experimental in SEs level, so as EU to obtain experience in that matter. The subsequent discussion 
indicated a more negative perception of the matter243. However, according to the Commission’s 
announcement, the main advantage would be the avoidance of unifying problems and the easier 
formation for European undertakings244. Primary, though, corporations would not have to deal with 
27 different tax systems245. Corporate mobility will be easier, whereas freedom of establishment and 
law arbitrage will be protected and sorted respectively. 
Accordingly, one prompt solution would be the adoption of the European Union Company Income 
Tax, an applicable tax code in EU level, to overcome the diversities, or home state taxation for all 
profits generated in different states, or the creation of an entirely new system246. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.I, p. 98-100, S. Hamburger, ’EU gets serious about tax harmonization(2002) 13’. 
International Tax Review, iss. 7,p. 62-64, C.Malke, supra p. 5, S.Kadi, supra p. 5, B. Ballester& M. del Monte, supra p. 42, 
A. Schulz and K.Eicker, supra p. 337-341 
243AnnouncementofCommission “Μίαεσωτερικήαγοράχωρίςφορολογικάεμπόδιατωνεπιχειρήσεων - επιτεύγματα, 
τρέχουσεςπρωτοβουλίεςκαιεναπομένονταπροβλήματα”, (Ec.europa.eu, 2020) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2003/EL/1-2003-726-EL-F1-1.Pdf> accessed 30 January 2020p.30, J. 
Kirshner, supra Article 2, p. 1289-1290, Dirk V. Gerven & Paul Strom, supra vol.I, p. 99 
244For more See Commissions’ Announcement.  
245C.Malke, supra p. 5 
246 S. Kadi, supra p. 22-23, Another proposal is the adoption of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). “The 
CCCTB does not affect national tax rates.  It simply sets out a common definition for what constitutes a taxable profit and 
procedures for allocating the profit among the Member States”, J. Kirshner, supra p. 1307-1308 
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CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS 
After the aforementioned analysis, it is justified that the SE does not have only advantages but some 
significant advantages hindering the progress of the relatively new institution.   
However, the author of this dissertation strongly believes that the establishment of SEs benefited 
the fiscal progress for the whole EU and the integration of the internal market247. The existence of 
weaknesses does not mean that the SE is doomed to fail per se.  
To assess the pros and cons of SE, one must examine the motives why an SE should be favoured in 
comparison with the respective domestic legal form. This is something problematic since SE is 
dependent on the seat of its registration. 
More specifically, there was an examination of the perks of converting to an SE. To sum up, we 
examined the emission of a European I.D and “transnationality” increasing the positive feedbacks 
from third parties, securing external funding and allowing the easier penetration to new markets. 
Secondly, corporate mobility was justified as an enormous advantage, whereas governance and 
control resulting from the Regulation create a quite preferable regime and to a more simplified 
regime. Finally, it was expressed that the dependence of national law deriving from art. 9 favours the 
phenomenon of “forum shopping” and subsequently the renewal of Corporate Laws. 
However, the Regulation provides for some defects as well. Moreover, the previously expressed 
domestic dependence hinders the unification of the law and more importantly the community 
character of the SE. The main positivity of corporate mobility is significantly affected since 
corporations are afraid to transfer their seat due to the subsequent change of applicable law. The 
regulatory competition vitiates the ulterior objective of the Regulation which is stated to be the 
completion of the internal market with no barriers, whereas the limited and expensive formation 
formula hinders the popularity of SEs and the freedom of corporate establishment. Furthermore, 
other issues are the adoption of the real seat theory affects once again the corporate mobility and 
the often time consuming, costly procedures and the often-vague text of the Statute. 
 
247C.Malke, supra p. 1 
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Surely, no one believed that the Regulation will result in stellar performances from the beginning, 
but the need for amendments is undeniable. The primary change, however, must be a change of 
perspective of MSs. The EU must proceed to a swift of momentum towards the unified goals. This is 
the reason why the Nobel Prize winner, J. Stiglitz, expressively correlated the interconnection of the 
success of Europe and the European project with the closer integration of countries of Europe248. If 
MS does not desire the further progress of the EU, no compromises can be made. 
The SE type aims to this very end, the completion of the internal market with the ultimate objective 
of EU continuous progress.  Assuredly, the Regulation is an enormous step in the right direction. It 
removes barriers and enables “the reorganization of their business on a Community-scale”. 
Therefore, the Regulation operates to legitimatize the coordination of entities established in 
different states and allows the subsequent corporate mobility as if there are no borders. It is not a 
fabrication of another corporation type, but it is used as construction for this mobility. 
Thus, the acquisition of a “European I.D” is allowing the penetration to new markets improving its 
dominant position in the EU and the world by adopting a corporate type more known than other 
national ones249. And as the CEO of Allianz SE said, the company is “European at heart250”. SEs are a 
new, parallel with the pro-existing types, supranational corporate form that reflects the EU 
principles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
248J.Stiglitz, suprap.xi 
249T. Papadopoulos, supra p.22, Έκθεση της Επιτροπής, supra p. 3 
250N.Lenoir, supra p. 15 
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